There are signs that the Revolutionary Guards have taken over the reins of power in Iran, marginalizing the civilian leadership
The Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) has evolved in recent decades from a paramilitary structure created to defend the Islamic revolution to a dominant actor that decisively influences both Iran's domestic politics and regional dynamics. In the context of recent leadership changes and military tensions, the Guardians appear to have taken control of Iran's main strategic decisions, Euronews reports.
Military exercises of the Revolutionary Guards before the war PHOTO EPA-EFE
According to assessments by US intelligence and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), IRGC commander Ahmad Vahidi currently plays a central role in Iran's leadership, making political and military decisions alongside Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. Within this new balance of power, civilian institutions appear marginalized: President Masoud Pezeshkian, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who led the first round of negotiations with the US, cannot act without the approval of the Revolutionary Guards.
Vahidi has already hinted that he holds the key levers of power, saying that in wartime all critical functions must be chosen and managed directly by the Guardians, according to Iran International.
Signs of this increased influence began to show. On March 25, President Pezeshkian was reportedly forced to appoint Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council at the request of the Guardians, despite the objections of the civilian leadership. In another case, the decision announced by the foreign minister to reopen the Strait of Hormuz was quickly reversed by the IRGC after the state media harshly criticized it, demonstrating the paramilitary force's ability to override the authority of the civilian government.
How did a paramilitary body absorb so much power
The IRGC was established in 1979 at the behest of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as a force to operate alongside the traditional army, weakened by post-revolutionary purges. Based on ideological loyalty and designed to use guerrilla tactics, it quickly consolidated during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), when young commanders rose rapidly through the ranks.
Ghalibaf himself reported that he commanded a division at 19–20.
Shortly after the establishment of the IRGC, Mohsen Rezaei was appointed Commander-in-Chief by Ayatollah Khomeini at the age of just 28, a position he held for 16 years. Later, Rezaei entered politics, unsuccessfully running several times in the presidential elections. He was succeeded by Yahya Rahim Safavi and then Mohammad Ali Jafari.
During Jafari's tenure, the IRGC played an important role in the disputed 2009 presidential election and the re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. After that election, protests erupted in Iran were repressed by IRGC forces and Basij units, while numerous figures with ties to the Revolutionary Guards were appointed to government positions by the president
Regionally, the IRGC's influence began to expand in the early years of the Iran–Iraq War, when affiliated forces began operating in Lebanon, contributing to the formation of Hezbollah in the early 1980s.
Subsequently, the Quds Force – the branch responsible for external operations and unconventional warfare – has been involved in several theaters of conflict in the Middle East. It supported the Syrian government during the civil war, was active in Iraq in the context of the power struggle after the fall of Saddam Hussein, and carried out operations against the Islamic State group.
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The Quds Force also provided military and logistical support to Hamas in Gaza and trained Houthi forces in Yemen. According to international media reports, the IRGC has also supplied drones and military equipment to Russia in the context of the war in Ukraine.
Economic Power and Networks of Influence
After the end of the war with Iraq, the IRGC assumed an important role in the economy, becoming a key actor in the reconstruction of the country. Through entities such as Khatam al-Anbiya, the body controls major infrastructure projects and strategic sectors while building networks of economic and social influence.
This expansion contributed to the emergence of a privileged elite associated with the regime, further consolidating their role in the state's power structure.
The IRGC has also expanded beyond Iran's borders, with considerable financial resources. It has spread throughout the region and parts of Latin America, particularly Venezuela.
Former commander Mohammad Ali Jafari stated in a 2016 interview that the IRGC is not just a conventional military force, but an institution tasked with protecting the political system and combating domestic threats.
At the same time, critics argue that the institution's name and symbols have little to do with Iran, but are meant to represent its mission to export the Islamic Revolution beyond national borders.
The IRGC operates as a vast network, including independent financial and banking institutions, scientific and academic centers for personnel training, as well as provincial branches and Basij bases throughout the country.
It consists of five main branches: the Land Forces, the Navy, the Aerospace Forces — particularly responsible for ballistic capabilities, the Basij and the Quds Force.
There are no reliable and up-to-date figures on IRGC forces. However, official statements indicate that its capacity to train and mobilize – particularly through coordination units, ideological-political structures and Basij networks – could exceed 220,000 people per year.
Recent years have brought major losses in the leadership of the IRGC, with several commanders being eliminated in operations attributed to Israel and the United States.
In 2020, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei appointed Major General Hossein Salami as commander of the IRGC. Salami was killed in Israeli strikes in June 2025.
His successor, Major General Mohammad Pakpour, was killed in US and Israeli strikes on February 28 alongside Khamenei.
After the death of the ayatollah and other high-ranking military leaders, Ahmad Vahidi took over as a close associate of the new supreme leader.
Despite these losses, the IRGC has demonstrated remarkable adaptability, operating as a decentralized structure. Reorganization into autonomous regional commands allowed it to continue operations and maintain control during recent conflicts.
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A new architecture of power in Iran
The death of the supreme leader and changes at the top of the state appear to have accelerated Iran's transition from a cleric-dominated system to one in which the IRGC plays a central role. In this new configuration, power is distributed across a network of interconnected actors rather than being concentrated in a single figure.
Although it remains an ideological institution, the IRGC appears to be redefining its role, placing less emphasis on strict enforcement of religious social norms and more on strategic control and state security.
This transformation raises important questions about Iran's future, the balance of power in the region, and how the international community will manage its relationship with an increasingly autonomous and influential actor.
