Maximilian Hess is an analyst and senior research fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.
This Sunday, Armenians will go to the polls to take part in key elections. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan presented the vote as referendum on its program for peace with Azerbaijan and closer relations with Europe. Although the issue of relations with Russia is not explicitly on the electoral agenda, the Kremlin has been trying to give it such importance in recent weeks.
Despite Pashinyan's journalistic past, President Vladimir Putin tolerated him, hoping that Russia's enormous influence would curb any multilateral instincts that Pashinyan might support. This strategy, however, failed as Moscow initially turned a blind eye to Azerbaijan's 2020 war to regain territories in and around Nagorno-Karabakh. The Kremlin then completely ignored Baku's subsequent recovery of all territory in 2023 and the resulting depopulation of ethnic residents of Armenian origin.
The Kremlin has taken a much more interventionist approach to the Armenian elections.
Putin publicly boasted about the arrest of Samvel Karapetyan, a billionaire turned opposition politician. Karapetyan has long been associated with Moscow and its economic interests in Armenia. A report published last month on The Insider claimed that Russian documents show that the billionaire worked for the intelligence services of the Federal Security Service (FSB). Recent investigations by Reuters and local media have shown that the Kremlin is not only conducting an active disinformation campaign, but is also considering supporting Armenian citizens in order to tip the scales in its favor.
However, the Kremlin also used one of its favorite tools – economic pressure through trade restrictions.
Trade war
In late May, Russia's agricultural safety watchdog, Rosselkhoznadzor, banned imports of flowers and mineral water, then extended restrictions to fresh tomatoes, cucumbers, peppers, herbs and strawberries. In early June, the import of almost all remaining agricultural products from Armenia was also banned. Russia, a real fishing power, has even restricted fish exports from landlocked Armenia.
In each case, the official justification was phytosanitary concerns – alleged pest infestations and unmet safety standards. However, despite these allegations, Russia's increased criticism of Pashinyan's government and its inadvertent, overt interference in pre-election politics suggest otherwise. During the April meeting, Putin called on his Armenian counterpart to release prisoners with Russian passports who wanted to “participate in [armeńskim] political process.” This was a clear reference to Karapetyan, the Russian-based billionaire behind the Strong Armenia party. Karapetyan was arrested in June last year on charges of trying to seize power.
The bans come at a time when the Kremlin's rhetoric has only intensified. The message isn't very subtle. Last week, Putin, referring to Pashinyan's efforts to promote potentially deeper integration with the EU, cited the onset of the “crisis in Ukraine” as dispute with Moscow in 2013 regarding a potential trade agreement with the EU.
Too often it is forgotten that Russia was the first to use trade pressure and sanctions to influence Ukraine in 2013. In July 2013, Moscow introduced an import ban on products from the famous Ukrainian chocolate manufacturer Roshen. It then deliberately slowed down much of the trade and deemed Ukrainian products high-risk. The West only did this to Russia after Putin's initial invasion of Crimea in February 2014.
The similarity is obvious and the stakes are high. Last year, Russia accounted for 35.8 percent. Armenia's total foreign trade.
Devastating consequences
Of the $3.14 billion (at the current exchange rate PLN 11 billion) of Armenia's exports to Russia, Armenia's agricultural exports alone amounted to USD 543 million in 2024. (PLN 1.9 billion) – almost the same as total Armenian exports to the EU in the same year. But this is not a game for Russia or Rosselkhoznadzor.
In 2006, Rosselkhoznadzor introduced bans on wine imports from Moldova and Georgia in response to the aspirations of the governments of these countries for deeper integration with the EU and, in the case of Georgia, also with NATO. Wine was and still is a key source of export income for both countries, and Russia absorbed between 80 and 90 percent of it at that time. their production. Later, the bans also covered other goods, including meat and carbonated water. The pretext was identical to the one used by Rosselkhoznadzor today: pesticides and safety violations.
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The effects were devastating. Wine production in Moldova has decreased by 60%. in one year, 25 percent Moldovan vineyards went bankrupt, and for goods worth an estimated $300 million. (PLN 1 billion), which had already been sent to Russia, has not been paid. Georgia's wine industry, which has built its position on Russian tastes for decades, has seen a collapse in export volumes. William Hill, then head of the OSCE mission in Moldova, stated that he had no doubts about it political nature of these bans. Already 20 years ago, Hill described this tactic as “the Russian modus operandi for the ages.”
Moldova's ban was only eased after Chisinau explicitly agreed to support Moscow's bid to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) that same year. However, the Georgian ban lasted until 2013 and was lifted only after the 2012 parliamentary elections, which brought Bidzina Ivanishvili's more conciliatory Georgian Dream party to power.
Moscow's next goals
The irony is that Moscow expanded the application of such import bans at the same time as Putin sharply criticizes Western economic pressure as unlawful. He even calls it an “economic blitzkrieg” aimed at destroying Russia's sovereign rights.
What is perhaps most striking is how far beyond the post-Soviet area this tactic has spread. In early 2024, after Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa confirmed that he would donate Soviet-era military equipment widely believed to be intended for Ukraine to the United States, Rosselkhoznadzor immediately announced that it had detected harmful insects in shipments from Ecuadorian banana companies and suspended their access to the Russian market. Ecuador supplies approximately 95 percent. bananas to Russia. The best substitute that Rosselkhoznadzor could offer was the suggestion that the Kremlin replace them with domestic production. Due to the unfavorable climate and the fact that all other investments were subordinated to Putin's war priorities, the ban turned out to be short-lived.
In a world of economic wars, the Kremlin cannot complain. After all, he was the pioneer of such trade extortion practices. But its rivals have moved on to compete for chips and other high-value goods. Because Putin chooses war over investment, he is doomed to use the same tools he has long used — even in his neighborhood, among weakening allies such as Armenia, but also against those widely perceived to be in his pocket.
When Abkhazia's de facto parliament voted in December 2024 to reject a Russian investment deal that would have given Moscow-backed investors broad privileges over the breakaway region of Georgia, Rosselkhoznadzor quickly banned the import of mandarins from Abkhazia. It was as if the clock had been turned back. The ban on the import of agricultural products from Abkhazia was introduced already in 2004, following the results of the elections in Abkhazia, which did not please Moscow.
Armenia is the newest target, but it certainly won't be the last.
I’m Ashley Davis as an editor, I’m committed to upholding the highest standards of integrity and accuracy in every piece we publish. My work is driven by curiosity, a passion for truth, and a belief that journalism plays a crucial role in shaping public discourse. I strive to tell stories that not only inform but also inspire action and conversation.
