The ban on minors' access to social media, which was introduced in Australia, has sparked a global debate on the protection of minors in the digital age. Several European states have decided to join the initiative and have advanced regulatory proposals in this regard. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez has already signaled his firm intention to adhere to the ban on social media for minors, and in France a similar ban is due to be voted on by the Senate. The debate is starting to take a strong shape in Romania as well. Beyond the arguments regarding the appropriateness of the ban, an aspect that should be analyzed is the compatibility of such a ban with the national and European constitutional framework.
The answer is far from unequivocal. Even though it was adopted in a historical context where social networks were at most the product of science fiction literature, the Romanian Constitution regulates the constitutional protection of interests that could be in conflict. Social networks are a means of exercising freedom of expression, a fundamental right susceptible to certain interferences, but only conditionally: the restriction must pursue a legitimate aim and be proportionate. A person's right to free expression is symmetrically matched by the right to receive information. From this angle, the Romanian Constitution provides in art. 31 para. (3) that “The right to information must not prejudice measures to protect young people (…)”. Therefore, banning access to social networks could be justified as a protective measure, especially in relation to the right to health protection and the right to mental integrity. In addition, art. 49 para. (1) of the Constitution requires the state to ensure children and young people a “special protection regime”. The Constitution does not define the notions of child and of youngcontext in which the Parliament opted for the Youth Law no. 350/2006 to define them as young people “citizens aged between 14 and 35”. Thus, in principle, the state would have the option of taking measures to protect children, but very strong arguments would have to be brought to justify both the necessity and the proportionality of the measure. This justification is all the more necessary, given that art. 49 para. (5) of the Constitution obliges the authorities to ensure the conditions for “the free participation of young people in political, social, economic life (…)”. At this point, the role of lawyers becomes a secondary one, being the task of other specialists to explain what we currently know about the impact of social networks on children and whether such a measure is capable of achieving a legitimate goal.
But the aspects I mentioned earlier represent only one element of the problem. Even if the conclusion were reached that access to social networks is harmful to children's development, who should have the right to decide: the state, through a generalized measure of prohibition, or the parents? According to art. 29 para. (6) of the Constitution, “Parents or guardians have the right to ensure, according to their own convictions, the education of minor children for whom they are responsible”. Moreover, by art. 48 of the Constitution stipulates both the right and the duty of parents to ensure “child rearing, education and training”. Thus, if the state has its own task in terms of ensuring the protection of children, no less important from a constitutional point of view is the correlation of this task with the role of parents. In the context of the debate on the banning of minors' access to social networks, strong arguments must be made to justify state intervention, because this means moving the decision-making power from the level of parents to the level of society, through the democratic mechanism of the decision made in Parliament. In other words, is the access of minors to social networks a problem that remains in the family sphere or, through the impact it generates, passes into the wider sphere of the whole society? The very validity of the political decision depends on the answer to this question. In October 2025, as the first Chamber consulted, the Senate passed with a large majority Law of majority onlinea legislative initiative that seeks to impose parental consent for the access of minors under the age of 16 to social networks. Although there seems to be a strong political consensus in the Parliament, specialists drew attention to the technical difficulties involved in this regulation, which the Chamber of Deputies is to decide on.
Another constitutional element that must be taken into account is the level of political decision. In November 2025, the European Parliament requested the adoption of legislative measures at the EU level, the proposed version being that the age from which access is allowed to be 16 years, and that minors between the ages of 13 and 16 can access social platforms only with the consent of their parents. In the current state of European legislation, the Digital Services Act (EU Regulation 2022/2065) establishes the obligation of online platform providers to adopt appropriate and proportionate measures to ensure a high level of safety for minors, and the European Commission published in July 2025 a set of recommendations aimed at ensuring a better level of protection for children.
It is difficult to anticipate whether it will be possible to act quickly, by adopting harmonized measures at the level of the European Union. But it is expected that in this matter the competence of the Union to adopt measures will be challenged, both by those who oppose harmonization in this sensitive area, and by the states that want to act quickly by establishing bans. At the same time, a true ban on the use of social networks could be qualified as an obstacle to the exercise of the fundamental freedoms provided for by Union law, one of which is the free movement of services. The Court of Justice of the European Union has already positioned itself in the sense of the need to correlate the legitimate interest of protecting minors with the freedom to provide services. For example, in Case C-244/06, Dynamic Medien Vertriebs GmbH v. Avides Media AG, the Court held that “although the protection of the child constitutes a legitimate interest capable of justifying, in principle, a restriction of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the EC Treaty, such as the free movement of goods (…), it is no less true that such restrictions can only be justified if they are likely to guarantee the achievement of the objective pursued and do not go beyond what is necessary for it to be achieved”. In other words, in the light of CJEU jurisprudence, a national measure adopted for the purpose of protecting minors, which imposes a restriction on a fundamental freedom guaranteed by EU law, is allowed if: (i) it is likely to guarantee the achievement of the objective pursued, (ii) it is proportionate and (iii) it is necessary to achieve the objective. In this context, one must also take into account art. 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union which recognizes both their freedom of expression and the need to take protective measures in accordance with the principle of the best interests of the child.
Also, certain particular situations can generate difficulties including from the perspective of property rights. It is possible for a minor under the age of 15 to have an account on social platforms that generates some income. If he were to be denied access to the social platform, such a measure might be qualified as a genuine deprivation of a “good” protected within the meaning of the European Convention on Human Rights. This is just one example of where other fundamental rights can come into play in the complex debate about banning access to social media.
To conclude, if the decision to ban minors' access to social networks is a political decision in its essence, in order to become binding, it must “put on a legal coat”. The regulation of such a ban cannot be valid unless it is in accordance with the constitutional norms. From the perspective of the Romanian Constitution, there are two complementary elements, which can be subsumed under the following question: are there sufficient arguments to justify the necessity and proportionality of state intervention through a general prohibition measure? In case of a positive answer, then the measure is possible. The same arguments can be used to justify a possible impairment of the freedom to provide services at the EU level, but without having the certainty that the CJEU and the constitutional courts would give the same answer to the question asked. Regarding the nature of the arguments, they should have a strong scientific basis. Reservations have already been expressed about the Australian model, with an adaptation of the measures according to age groups being proposed.
The debate about minors' access to social networks should not be viewed strictly from the perspective of the need for state or European Union intervention to solve a momentary problem. On the contrary, this is only one stage of a phenomenon designated in the specialized literature under the form digital constitutionalisma phenomenon in which the old constitutional principles adapt to the new realities.
An article signed by Constantin Cosmin Pintilie, Managing Associate – [email protected] – and by Cristiana-Victoria Romanovschi, Junior Lawyer – [email protected] – STOICA & ASSOCIATES
Article supported by STOICA & ASSOCIAțII
