Why China is unlikely to intervene in support of Iran

As the United States and Israel continue bombing Iran, Beijing is watching developments closely. China is Tehran's most important economic partner, and the relationship between the two states has developed on the basis of common interests: opposition to the global order dominated by the West and economic cooperation, especially in the field of energy.

The President of China, Xi Jinping/PHOTO: EPA/EFE
However, analysts say Beijing is unlikely to intervene directly in support of the Iranian regime. China's priority is not the survival of the government in Tehran, but the maintenance of oil flows from the Middle East, writes foreignaffairs.com.
Oil, Beijing's main interest
China is highly dependent on energy from the region. In 2025, more than 55% of China's oil imports came from the Middle East, including about 13% directly from Iran. Most of these shipments pass through the Strait of Hormuz, a strategic sea route close to Iran's coasts.
The recent attacks risk disrupting oil production in Iran and other Gulf states. Some voices have suggested that this could prompt Beijing to provide support to Tehran, including dual-use equipment — similar to the aid given to Russia in the Ukraine war.
So far, however, China's response has been limited. After the 12-day conflict between Israel and Iran in June 2025, Beijing limited itself to standard diplomatic statements in support of Iran.
In recent statements by the Chinese Foreign Ministry, the harshest criticism was aimed at the assassination of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, not the military campaign as a whole. At the same time, China called on all parties involved — including Iran — to stop military operations and stressed the importance of respecting the sovereignty of the Gulf states.
The relationship with Iran, increasingly complicated
China's strategy in Iran has long been based on the idea that Tehran could serve as a foothold for Beijing's influence in the Middle East. In 2021, the two countries signed a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement, estimated at around $400 billion.
In practice, however, many of the planned projects did not materialize. Iran has feared that Chinese investment could impinge on its sovereignty, and Beijing has grown frustrated with what it sees as its Iranian partner's lack of consistency.
Chinese analysts also believe that Iran's power is often overestimated. Although it has a population ten times that of Israel and three times that of Saudi Arabia, Iran's economy is much smaller: Iran's gross domestic product is less than 90% of Israel's and only about a quarter of Saudi Arabia's.
Doubts about Iran's military capability
According to many Chinese experts, Iran has relied heavily on proxy wars and asymmetric warfare tactics to deter adversaries.
Beijing, however, believes that Tehran has not demonstrated sufficient determination in direct confrontations. For example, after the killing of General Qasem Soleimani by the United States in 2020 or after the Israeli attack on the Iranian embassy in Syria in 2024, Iran's reactions were perceived by many Chinese observers as limited.
During the 2025 conflict, some commentators also criticized Iran for giving advance warning to certain states before launching missiles, which was described in Chinese online media as “symbolic retaliation”.
Dissatisfaction with the internal situation as well
In China's political analysis environment, there is also criticism of the way Iran is governed. Experts talk about poor decisions, corruption and management problems.
Israel's ability to infiltrate Iran's security apparatus — which has allowed for precise attacks against military leaders and scientists — has raised questions in Beijing about the stability of the Iranian system.
In this context, China does not seem to consider regime change in Tehran as the worst possible scenario. Its priority remains economic cooperation and the stability of energy flows.
United States Relations Factor
Another reason Beijing avoids direct involvement is its relationship with Washington. US President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping are expected to meet soon, and Beijing does not want tensions in the Middle East to affect bilateral talks.
What could change China's position
Although China has invested heavily in renewable energy and other energy sources, oil remains central to its economy — especially for air transport, shipping and the petrochemical industry.
China's strategic reserves are estimated at around 1.3–1.4 billion barrels, equivalent to around 30% of annual imports. These reserves could only cover a temporary interruption of supplies.
One scenario that could change Beijing's calculus would be the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, through which more than half of China's imported oil passes.
Until now, many Chinese experts considered this scenario unlikely, as it would trigger a global energy crisis and also affect Iran's revenues.
The possibility of a prolonged war
An even bigger test for China would be a protracted conflict. If Iran were to resist the bombing and demonstrate the ability to retaliate effectively, Beijing could face a strategic dilemma.
In such a scenario, China could end up providing indirect support similar to that given to Russia in the Ukraine war — for example by providing dual-use technologies, oil purchases, or technology support for the defense industry.
On the other hand, if the Iranian regime were to collapse quickly, Beijing would likely try to establish relations with the country's new leaders. For China, the main objective remains the same: maintaining oil flows from the Middle East and protecting economic interests.




