Tehran's ghost networks. How Iran used an Emirati company to acquire Chinese military technology
An investigation published by the Financial Times (FT), based on leaked trade and shipping documents, reveals how the feared Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) used a network of suppliers based in the Emirates to acquire state-of-the-art Chinese satellite equipment vital to its military drone program.
Iran benefited from the support of Russia and China during the war/PHOTO:X
The cynical irony of this operation lies in the fact that the Emirati-registered front company was supplying communications equipment to the very same unit of the Iranian armed forces that was launching missiles and drones at the Gulf monarchies in response to US-Israeli strikes.
The weak link in the free economic zones of the Emirates
Despite Abu Dhabi's deeply hostile stance towards Tehran today, the Emirates has historically been a financial hub and offshore haven for Iranian business. Analysts point out that the transformation of the UAE into the most important regional commercial hub in the last two decades has come with a major vulnerability: the proliferation of free economic zones, where control over the flow of goods is greatly diluted. This lax environment facilitated the circumvention of international sanctions and the development of smuggling of dual-use technologies.
Documents analyzed by the FT show that the acquisition of Chinese militarized technology was completed at the end of 2025 through the company Telesun, located in the emirate of Ras al-Khaimah. This entity orchestrated the transport of approximately 1.8 tons of satellite dish equipment from Shanghai to Iran, transiting the Jebel Ali port in Dubai.
Rama III Ghost Track and GPS Data Manipulation
Retracing the route through satellite data and maritime tracking systems exposes the camouflage techniques used by Tehran:
August 28: The container of military equipment, produced in Shanghai by the Chinese company StarWin (a 4.5-meter motorized antenna), arrives in Dubai aboard the Chinese ship Zhong Gu Yin Chuan.
November 23: The container is taken from the port by the Iranian ship Rama III.
November 24-25: Rama III leaves the Persian Gulf and transmits false GPS signals indicating a fictitious stationing off the coast of Oman to hide its true route.
November 29: Satellite images confirm the presence of the ship in Iran's Shahid Rajaee port of Bandar Abbas – the final destination mentioned in the secret documents.
Iranian customs registered the 1.8-tonne cargo in six crates as “antenna and accessories”, with Ertebatat Faragostar Kish (EFK) as the recipient. The investigation shows that EFK was acting within a project for Saman Industrial Group – an entity under US Treasury Department sanctions since December 2023 to facilitate the procurement of components for IRGC drones (actuators, antennas and other critical parts).
Connections under sanctions and the stake of the new truce
The logistics chain does not stop here. The shipper to Iran was Blue Calm Marine Services, another entity sanctioned by Washington in 2023 for supporting the logistics of the Iranian Defense Ministry's missile program. Moreover, these revelations come after the FT revealed last month that the IRGC Aerospace Force had secretly bought a satellite from the Chinese company The Earth Eye (recently sanctioned by the US), used to spy on US bases and infrastructure in the Gulf before the devastating attacks in March.
