After Zelanski's visit to Germany. There was no breakthrough, there was no failure
Wołodymyr Zelanski first met in German territory with Friedrich Merz, a new chancellor, in the context of a changed geopolitical reality after arriving at the White House of Donald Trump's administration.
Last time, in October 2024, Zelanski talked in the German capital with Olaf Scholz. Democrats were still exercising in Washington. The West seemed unanimous in the desire to help Ukraine in opposing Russian aggression. For many It was Germany who was a “weak link” in the common front of support for Kiev.
The current visit of the Ukrainian president also took place in the context of lively debates on the possible supply of German rockets Taurus to the Ukrainian armed forces and generally prospects for a violent increase in the defense potential of Germany and Europe. What brought Zelanski's visit to Berlin and what will her practical consequences be?
The entire visit of the Ukrainian delegation took place under the sign of military assistance. Kiev's position is clear: in the context of the war for destruction and complete uncertainty as to the support of the US, the Ukrainian army needs a wide range of weapons here and now. Berlin, in turn, must take into account much more complex factors: positions in the ruling coalition, public opinion demands, interactions with allies and the actual possibilities of the German military and industrial complex.
For this reason, German-Ukrainian agreements could not be groundbreaking, as supporters of a sharper course towards Russia would like, especially in connection with the recent statements of Merz about the abolition of the limitations of the scope of use of German weapons supplied the supplied Ukrainian army. Despite this, the visit cannot be called a failure.
Four foundations of cooperation between Germany and Ukraine
Many details of agreements in the military sphere are probably inaccessible to the media. Merz, as the head of government, ordered that the details of the supply of weapons to Ukraine – neither types, nor quantities nor deadlines – should not be made public.
However, several directions have become quite clear. Firstly, Germany is ready to create its own Ukrainian political vector. The well -known saying of Scholz, the predecessor of Merz, about readiness to help Ukraine “as long as necessary” corresponds to the course of the new government, despite the position of the White House and objective difficulties.
Secondly, Berlin puts on a double support model. It is in fact a recognition of the fact that Germany and all of Europe in the current situation are not able to effectively and quickly satisfy the needs of the Ukrainian armies for a long time exclusively at the expense of its own stocks and production capacity. You need time for restructuring and qualitative increase. Therefore, in addition to the current supplies of military equipment, the parties agreed German investments in the Ukrainian military-industrial complex, in particular in the production of long-range rockets directly in Ukraine. Such cooperation was already practiced, e.g. with the participation of the leading Rheinmetall concern. Now it will become systematic and filled with new content.
The topic of long -range weapons capable of setting goals deeply on Russia, which the Germans were reluctant to, is no longer taboo. Specific investment amounts are given and prospects are outlined. It is deliberately done openly, which, moreover, emphasized Muz, talking about the “consequences” of the refusal of Moscow looking for a way to the room.
Thirdly, German support will not be limited to weapons and defense technologies. Germany also declared solidarity with Ukraine in the economic sphere. Berlin does not intend to return to the purchase of Russian energy raw materials and does not consider it possible to repair and start Nord Stream. The Chancellor's unequivocal statement that the government wants to “do everything possible to prevent the reuse of” gas pipelines, spoken in the presence of Zelanski, symbolizes the final rejection of policy by Germany Business as Usal.
This sounds particularly loud in the context of voices from Washington and Germany themselves, suggesting that the prospect of resuming the purchases of Russian gas by their former largest consumer can be used as an encouragement for the Kremlin to alleviate their position in the war.
Fourth, the pages announced resumption of German-Ukrainian government consultations by the end of the year. This statement passed unnoticed and for a reason: this format was created during the time of President Leonid Kuczma in 1998 and was not used for many years. It provides for multi -level cooperation between various ministries of both countries. Such cooperation is important for supporting the “non -war” sectors of Ukraine and is targeted for the future when the reconstruction of the destroyed Ukrainian infrastructure on full scale begins.
What about the Taurus? It's not that simple
Discussions about the possibility of giving Ukraine German-Swedish Taurus maneuvering missiles with a range of over 500 km has been going on in Germany for several years. And while the previous, centro -leaved coalition under Scholz's leadership rejected such a possibility, Merz, who was the opposition leader up to early elections in February 2025, He repeatedly appealed to send Taurus to Ukraineand even suggested using the very possibility of such a step as an element of pressure on Vladimir Putin.
Wołodymyr Zelnski, welcomed by the then Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Berlin, October 11, 2024
However, already during the election campaign, as well as after appointing to the Chancellor, Merz started Avoid a direct answer to the question of whether Germany is ready to convey this weapon Ukraine. During the visit of Zelanski, the Chancellor also did not say “yes” or “no”, but suggested that “such a decision is not impossible.” And against colleagues from the CDU, who think that time has already come for such actions.
During the time of Scholz in public space there were many arguments against the supplies of Taurus to Ukraine: reluctance to act alone without waiting for similar steps of allies from NATO, fear of getting involved in direct confrontation with Russia and escalation, “excessive” reach, technical details related to airports, and finally doubts about the possibility of programming and leading poles without directly programming the presence of German specialists in the combat zone.
All these arguments were consistently overthrown by military lawyers and experts. He lost his last argument in connection with information about the operation of Taurus in the armed forces of South Korea. According to media reports, this country, not belonging to NATO, bought Taurus from Germany in stages, and now its soldiers can independently perform all necessary activities related to rocket maintenance without the presence of specialists from Germany.
Much less is said about another obstacle: a negative attitude of a significant number of high -ranking German military officials. According to open sources, the Bundeswehr has about 600 Taurus missiles, of which 300 are considered to be able to use immediately. In fact Taurusy are the most powerful weapon that Germany has – A country that has neither nuclear weapons or missiles with a range of over 1000 km. It would be highly undesirable so that the army would give up a significant part of its rocket arsenal, which would not cause existential change in the war.
In 2024, a large Taurus modernization program began, and a decision was also made to increase rocket production. However, all this takes time. Most likely, it was the generals of the generals that was the main obstacle to the supply of Taurus to Ukraine. Hence the search for new solutions, one of which will be the location of the production of long -range rockets directly in Ukraine.
“Window of possibilities” opens
Intending to expand military assistance for Ukraine, Merz must take into account many factors. And they are not only an economic or financial nature. The coalition government also includes social democrats, including many “escalation critics” and supporters of “diplomatic conflict resolution”. Even if such a solution is not currently possible.
In the Bundestag, Christian Democrats must face the pressure from the opposition: on the one hand there are greens who insist on more active support for Kiev, and on the other, an extremely right -wing alternative to Germany, which would like to immediately stop all help for Ukraine and return to “Nafta and Gas Friendship” with Moscow.
Wołodymyr Zelnski and Friedrich Merz. Berlin, May 28, 2025
However, probably The biggest challenge for the Chancellor is public opinion. Subdives show that the number of opponents of continuing the supply of weapons to Kiev exceeds the number of supporters in almost all EU countries, except for the Scandinavian countries. This is also characteristic for Germany. Until recently, the polls recorded a stable majority of Germans supporting active military assistance for Ukraine. The reasons for changing moods are in fatigue, fear of escalation of the conflict to the World War and a lack of understanding of weapon supply.
People who talk to the withdrawal of support for Ukraine, including military support, are often considered, if not pro -Russian, it certainly unaware threats to European collective security currently emanating from the Kremlin. In part, this is true. Ultralevists and ultra -laws who admire the “strong leader of Putin”, supporters of conspiracy theories and convinced Eurosceptics are not really against leaving Ukraine to Russia's state.
An example of Germany shows, however, that some opponents of the continuation of the pro-Ukrainian course of Scholz and Merza offices do not necessarily negate the need to create a new “umbrella of security” in Europe, an independent European military-industrial complex and the need to strengthen the defense component, as long as the United States, which have become an unpredictable partnerthey are ready de facto abandon the obligations set out in the NATO treaty.
In these circles, Merz's words about the transformation of the Bundeswehr into the “strongest army on the continent” can be met with positive response. In German society, the awareness is growing that the world will no longer be the same, and in the current geopolitical conditions, Germany will inevitably have to take more responsibility in the defense sector. Here, too, “window of possibilities” for the current German government opens.
