Russian culture is also a weapon of the Kremlin. Putin's narrative attacks in non-obvious places
More than 12 years of Russia's war against Ukraine might suggest that there is no longer any need to explain to anyone the threats resulting from Russia's cultural policy abroad. However, reality shows something completely different. Russian culture and its representatives are still present in the everyday cultural life of European countries and they are still successful on the so-called Global South.
You might think that the world has already condemned Russia for its actions, sanctioned Russian artists, and even initiated criminal proceedings against some of the most recognizable figures of Russian culture. That's true. The deeper problem, however, is this Much of the world still clings to the belief that “culture and science are beyond politics”which allows Russia to act according to its own rules.
Russian cultural diplomacy is still active
Nearly four years later, despite restrictions and public criticism, these structures are still operational and they openly promote the Kremlin's narrative to European audienceswhile contributing to political destabilization.
For Moscow, Europe's reaction in 2022 was a painful surprise. In Russia's worldview strategy, the belief that “culture is beyond politics” has long played a key role in shaping the European view of war, Ukraine and Russia itself.
The Kremlin did not intend to give up this sphere of influence and quickly found loopholes to continue these activities. One such mechanism is diplomatic protection of directors of Russian cultural centersmany of whom are formally associated with diplomatic missions or the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2023, the case of the Russian House in Berlin and its head, Pavel Izvolsky, was particularly loud.
Changing financing has become another way around sanctions. After freezing your bank accounts many centers have switched to cash payments or started relying on “charitable donations” and “patron gifts”which makes it much more difficult to track and block financial flows.
Unequal enforcement of sanctions by EU Member States also plays an important role. Individual governments are responsible for their implementation, a the actions taken vary significantly. Romania, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia closed Russian cultural centers in 2022. Moldova joined them in 2025, labeling them a “direct threat to national security.”
Germany, France and the Czech Republic, despite public support for Ukraine, have not decided to close these facilities. The reasons are various: previous political and economic arrangements with Moscow, a sense of historical guilt towards the Russians after World War II, a still strong belief in the concept of “culture beyond politics”, weak legal mechanisms or a traditional reluctance to intensify conflicts.
Appropriation of Ukrainian cultural creators is also still commonespecially such as Kazimierz Malevich, Borys Pasternak and Aleksandra Ekster. The narratives promoted by these centers usually emphasize either “brotherly ties” between countries – as in the Czech Republic, Romania and Hungary – or Russia's supposedly decisive influence on the cultural development of countries such as Spain, France, Germany and Italy.
In some cases, the activities go far beyond cultural diplomacy. In 2024, Serbian accordionist Aleks Mirković visited occupied Crimea thanks to the support of the Russian House in Belgrade. In Rome, it was promoted during lectures “the need for a just multipolar world order” along with Russian narratives about the “reunification” of occupied Ukrainian territories with Russia.
Sanctions have failed to stop Russia's cultural expansion. They changed its geography
Concrete numbers show this. Before 2022, Rossotrudnichestvo operated seven centers in Africa, most of which were established during the Soviet era. By 2025, their number has increased to 22, and another 14 are in the process of being created. Twelve Russian cultural centers also operate in Latin America, Asia and the Middle East.
Billboard with birthday wishes for Vladimir Putin in Bamako, capital of Mali, October 12, 2024.AFP
In these regions, Russia acts much more openly and aggressively than in Europe. Lectures on Russian culture in Tunis or Mar del Plata, language clubs in Damascus, film screenings in Caracas, theater performances in Santiago, concerts in Amman, Benghazi and Tashkent, and exhibitions devoted to the “Great Patriotic War” are just a piece of a much broader strategy.
Through these centers, Russia systematically promotes political narratives such as: “The West is the colonizer, Russia is the liberator”, “Russia is a partner in the struggle for sovereignty”, and “the choice between the West and Russia is a choice between humiliation and dignity.” Behind this rhetoric are youth recruitment activities, military and economic agreements, and access to natural resources.
The Gorchakov Foundation, for example, runs long-term initiatives such as the “Asian Dialogue” and the “Central Asia School”, as well as programs for electricians, health care workers, STEM specialists and nuclear sector workers in African countries.
In the context of the future of Russian cultural diplomacy, two recent trends are particularly telling. The first is the “Russian Seasons” programlaunched in Brazil in 2024, continuing in Bahrain and Oman in 2025, and scheduled for Thailand in 2026. Touring shows by Russian theaters, museum exhibitions and cultural exchange programs are part of a broader strategy to normalize the concept of the “Russian world.”
The second trend is the deepening of cultural cooperation between Russia and authoritarian regimes. This includes the Year of Russian Culture in China in 2024–2025, agreements with North Korea on expanding cultural exchanges in 2025–2027, and a memorandum concluded in 2025 between the so-called the Russian State Art Gallery and museums in Mexico and Brazil.
For decades The Kremlin convinced the world that culture was beyond politics. But it was never a philosophical principle. It was an influence strategy. Currently, Russian Houses operate in Bangui and Bamako, Russian Seasons visit Rio de Janeiro and Bangkok, and museums in Mexico sign contracts with institutions related to the occupied Crimea – often without notice and without consequences. All this is happening in parallel with a full-scale war that is now in its fifth year.
The question is no longer whether it poses a threat. The question is how much more needs to happen — in Europe, Africa, Asia and the Americas — so that the slogan “culture is beyond politics” ceases to be a convenient answer to uncomfortable questions.
