On April 15, 2026, the president of the European Commission announced that the technical solution (application) for online age verification made under the coordination of the European executive will soon be available. The entire speech centered on the need to protect children in the online environment, an objective firmly assumed by the European Commission and accelerated by the positions of certain member states regarding the prohibition of minors' access to social networks. Ursula von der Leyen's statements were as firm as can be: no more excuses and online platforms that do not protect our children are to be held accountable.
This approach is not just a simple political statement, but follows a strategy of the European Commission. One month ago, on March 26, 2026, the Commission announced the preliminary results of an investigation launched into the compliance by the operators of adult websites (pornographic content) with the provisions of the Digital Services Act (Regulation 2022/2065), the conclusion being that simple user statement that he is over 18 is not an effective measure to prevent minors from accessing harmful content. What is obvious to anyone from a factual point of view has thus also acquired legal valences. From a legal point of view, in the context where the applicable rules do not indicate a specific protection formula, but only the obligation to take appropriate measures, it is expected that the technical solution for online age verification proposed by the Commission will define STANDARD for the measures to protect minors to be considered compliant. For clarity, the use of the Commission's application itself is not mandatory, other technical solutions may be used as long as they have a similar level of suitability. In other words, mechanisms that do not involve a check based on the formula proposed by the Commission may be considered inadequate, the consequences of which may go as far as the application of sanctions.
The effects are not only limited to the big platforms or social networks, but it is expected that the same standard of age verification will end up being considered mandatory for accessing other services; for example, to place an online order for alcoholic products, purchase games or simply to be able to verify the age required for valid consent under data protection legislation. Thus, the imposition of this technical standard by the Commission may affect any company that carries out online commerce with age-restricted products or services as its object. If this will be the future approach of the competent authorities, European or national, then the paradigm of how we will use the Internet will change, as at least part of the sites or platforms will have to abandon the simple declaration of the user that he is of the minimum age imposed by the specific legislation and implement an effective age verification system. If some cases are clear (eg, platforms with pornographic content), a difficulty that could arise relates to the concrete establishment of content harmful to minors, as well as the differences between national regulations (eg, different age levels).
Multiple analyzes have already highlighted the existence of vulnerabilities in the technical system developed by the European Commission. However, beyond the technical aspects that can be improved, there remain some fundamental issues that are still worth looking into. On the one hand, as I pointed out in a previous article, under the current constitutional arrangement, the state and the European Union have the obligation to support parents in the process of educating and raising children, without being able to intervene more than is necessary in this sphere. On the other hand, the possibility that many platforms or sites may become overly cautious and impose age verification as a precaution against possible sanctions should not be overlooked, although their content is not harmful to minors, a matter that raises some questions regarding the unwanted effects that age verification in the online environment could generate in the medium and long term.
It remains to be seen what will be the approach of the jurisdictions that have the competence to check whether such measures are compatible with fundamental rights. For now, the closest case is Free Speech Coalition, Inc. et al. al. v. Paxton (June 27, 2025), in which the United States Supreme Court upheld as free speech a Texas law that required access to sites with pornographic content to be done only on the basis of identity verification through the use of an official document or credible proof of age (eg, credit card) or a digital age verification service. In Romania, the closest precedent could be identified in the Decision of the Constitutional Court no. 498/2018, in which the Court emphasized that it cannot be allowed from a constitutional point of view to condition medical services on the provision of consent for data processing through the electronic health file. But, in principle, a regulation that would require the presentation of proof of age in the digital environment, for certain limited situations, should not automatically lead to a violation of the right to private life, as long as it is accompanied by sufficient guarantees to ensure confidentiality.
At this moment, businesses that have, under Romanian or EU law, the obligation not to market products or services intended for minors are in a position of slight uncertainty. From the perspective of the European Commission, the mere mention in the terms of use of a site of the minimum age is no longer sufficient to ensure compliance with the applicable rules. At least a tendency to extend the standard created by the Commission in the specific context of the Digital Services Regulation to other areas is expected.
Footnotes:
(1) See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_26_817
(2) See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_722
(3) See: https://www.techpolicy.press/the-eus-age-verification-fix-creates-more-problems-than-it-solves/ or https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-brussels-launched-age-checking-app-hackers-say-took-them-2-minutes-break-it/
(4) See: https://hotnews.ro/interzicerea-accesului-minorilor-la-retelele-sociale-poate-decizia-politica-sa-imbrace-haina-juridica-2172143
(5) The decision of the Supreme Court is available at the following address: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-1122_3e04.pdf
(6) The decision of the Constitutional Court is available at the following address: https://www.ccr.ro/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Decizie_498_2018.pdf
An article signed by Constantin Cosmin Pintilie, Managing Associate – [email protected].
Article supported by STOICA & Asociații
