Paradoxically, the search for a stable ceasefire has moved the end of the fighting in Ukraine away. Four arguments

Neither Kiev nor Moscow can take seriously the security guarantees for Ukraine discussed by the “Coalition for the Will” in the absence of serious institutional foundations and sufficient material support, writes German political science professor Andreas Umland, in an opinion piece published today by HotNews. However, Ukraine may be forced to follow the “principle of hope” and accept the security guarantees it can get, not the ones it needs, and such a situation would represent a pause in the war to Russia's advantage, believes the political scientist and historian specializing in the study of Russian and Ukrainian politics.

• Andreas Umland studied political science and history in Berlin, Oxford, Stanford and Cambridge, is an associate professor at the Department of Political Science of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (NaUKMA) and an analyst at the Stockholm Center for East European Studies (SCEEUS) of the Swedish Institute of International Relations (UI).

In early 2025, spurred by the Trump administration's efforts to secure a peace deal in Ukraine, France and the United Kingdom initiated talks on security guarantees for Ukraine under the so-called Coalition of the Willing. For Europe, it was a way to show Trump that the Europeans were serious about getting more involved in the game, hoping to become part of the negotiations.

The central question in these talks was how a future truce between Russia and Ukraine could be constructed so that Russia would be deterred from attacking Ukraine again in a few years. How can the mistakes of the past be avoided in the future?

In many ways, the discussion was a useful exercise in that it outlined in detail some preconditions for a stable future peace. International talks on security guarantees have, for the first time, led civilian and military officials in Western capitals to seriously envision and plan their countries' future engagement in, around, and within Ukraine. At the same time, however, these discussions suffered – and continue to suffer – from four shortcomings.

The announcements further reduced the Kremlin's willingness to stop the fighting

First, talks and negotiations on security guarantees for Ukraine have done very little to end the war, at least so far.

Various concrete proposals made regarding the future security of Ukraine, such as those regarding a “reassurance force” or the integration of air defense systems of NATO's eastern flank with those of Ukraine, have evoked positive reactions in Kyiv. However, this outline of Western plans to help Ukraine defend itself in the future – either through direct military engagement or through military-industrial cooperation – has had and continues to have negative effects on Moscow.

Paradoxically, the search for a stable truce has pushed the end of the fighting away. Long-delayed suggestions by countries such as the United Kingdom and France, especially the stationing of troops from the Coalition of the Will countries in western Ukraine, have raised the stakes and increased the Kremlin's mistrust of post-war developments. This diminished Russia's already low willingness to seek compromises and make concessions.

Such announcements further reduced the Kremlin's willingness to stop fighting before it had a clear advantage on the battlefield and amplified its desire for a peace of victory, that is, a peace imposed by the victor on the vanquished (Siegfrieden), rather than a negotiated peace (Verständigungsfrieden).

Indeed, Russia categorically rejected the idea of ​​the presence of foreign troops in Ukraine. As Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated in March 2025: “The presence of troops from NATO countries, under any flag, on Ukrainian territory represents the same threat [ca și aderarea Ucrainei la NATO]. We do not accept it under any conditions”.

A collection of intentions, scenarios and promises

Second, the various plans to guarantee Ukraine's future security contain few concrete elements of immediate material relevance.

These much-discussed security guarantees are a collection of intentions, scenarios, and promises that, if implemented, would partially bolster Ukraine's security through a token presence of troops, air police, and the like. Western plans, however, do not envisage an essential improvement either in international integration or in Ukraine's military defense capability. Instead, the official negotiations focus on the configuration, conditions, formulation and ratification of future multilateral response mechanisms should Moscow resort to escalation again.

The idea – noble in itself – of security guarantees for Ukraine simply proposes that Kiev trust a certain algorithm of future Western actions of limited proportions. It also optimistically assumes that Moscow will believe in the feasibility and consistency of the proposed reactive algorithm.

However, the security guarantees envisaged so far do not provide for any organizational structure, such as NATO, to support them. Nor do they include a significant military presence of Western troops stationed along the future Russian-Ukrainian contact line. In the absence of serious institutional foundations and sufficient material support, neither Kiev nor Moscow can take security guarantees for Ukraine seriously.

The scenario in which the Ukrainian leadership will be condemned to military passivity

However, Ukraine may have to follow the “principle of hope” and accept the security guarantees it can get, not the ones it needs. In such a case, however, any future truce could prove to be simply an interregnum until full-scale fighting resumes.

Moreover, it would represent a pause in the war to Russia's advantage, as it would allow Moscow to choose a convenient time for further escalation. For example, during a parallel military escalation in the South China Sea or elsewhere.

At the same time, the Ukrainian leadership – hoping that at least some of the promises made in the security agreement will be fulfilled – will be condemned to future military passivity and unpleasant surprises.

In a sense, such a scenario would represent a repeat of Ukraine's post-2014 experience with the now-notorious “Memorandum on Security Assurances” of 1994. Kiev then signed the Budapest Memorandum, although in 1993 there had been a Ukrainian request and draft for a full treaty between Ukraine and the P5, which would have required each permanent member of the UN Security Council to take “necessary measures” if any state possessor of nuclear weapons would make a “threat or resort to force or the threat thereof, in any form, against the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine.”

Inconsistency, contradictions and retractions

Third, the current debate remains only theoretical, to the extent that it cannot predict the concrete situation on the ground in which security guarantees will ultimately be granted to Ukraine. The exact manner and conditions under which the high-intensity fighting will end will determine the nature and sustainability of a future ceasefire.

The position on the battlefield and the socio-economic situation of both countries when the guns fall silent will essentially determine the stability and duration of the armistice.

The content and wording of future security guarantees will certainly play a role as well. It is not enough that any future guarantees will have to be adapted to the existing environment in which they are offered.

Their relevance to Western suppliers, to the Ukrainian beneficiary and to Russia as a potential trigger will depend more on real-world developments than promises made on paper. Ukraine's position vis-a-vis Russia will determine the meaning of any security guarantees, as will each country's relations with third actors.

The more advantageous Ukraine's military, economic and international situation is when a ceasefire begins, the less likely it will be that Western guarantees for Ukrainian security will be implemented. Conversely, the more difficult Ukraine's overall situation is once the fighting ends, the more likely a re-escalation becomes and the more plausible a Ukrainian request to activate security safeguards.

Last but not least, the Western public debate on future security guarantees for Ukraine over the past year has been characterized by inconsistency, contradictions and retractions. The exact role of the United States as provider of a vaguely defined “safety net” for guarantees still remains unclear. The size, location, type, and even the mere possibility of a Western “reassurance force” in Ukraine remain controversial topics.

The situation on the ground, economically and on the battlefield, is decisive today and will remain crucial tomorrow

Recently, the Trump administration brought new uncertainty to European planning for a ceasefire in Ukraine when it announced its desire to annex Greenland and began talks with Moscow on future economic cooperation. Given the US willingness to confront a close ally and collaborate with a traditional adversary, European leaders, including those in Ukraine, have become wary of American assurances to help implement future security guarantees.

In conclusion, the Western debate on security guarantees for Ukraine, which began in 2025, is a step in the right direction, but it is premature and could even function as a form of evasion.

Discussing the second step—securing the truce—without a clear plan on how to achieve the first, that is, to achieve that truce, could distract from the problem rather than help solve it. This is especially true because the success of the second step – the deterrent effect of security guarantees on Russia – will be crucially determined by the nature of the first step, that is, how and under what conditions the fighting ends in Ukraine.

Neither the end of the current war nor the stability of a future armistice will be primarily determined by how the security guarantees for Ukraine are formulated on paper. Instead of the scythe or scythe of verbal obligations of Western countries, the material situation on the ground, in the economic field and on the battlefield, is decisive today and will remain crucial tomorrow. The kind of material and financial aid Kiev needs to bring the fighting to an acceptable end will be, in many ways, similar to the kind of support Ukraine will need once a ceasefire is agreed to protect itself from further attack.

The opinion article was originally published in Contributors.ro.