The International Institute for Strategic Studies analyzes to what extent the Gulf states, increasingly affected by Iran's attacks, could respond more harshly to aggressive actions. Why do they prefer not to attack the aggressor.
Skyscraper hit by drone in Dubai. PHOTO: video capture x @MarioNawfal @euronews png
Despite previously asserting neutrality and trying to avoid war, the Gulf states are now bearing the brunt of Iran's retaliation against US and Israeli aggression, according to an analysis by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London-based think tank specializing in reporting on international politics and security. Iran has launched at least 1,946 missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) against the UAE alone, far exceeding the number of projectiles fired at Israel. In addition to targeting US military bases and facilities in the region, Iran is striking a wide range of civilian targets in the Gulf states, including hotels, airports, ports, and oil and gas infrastructure, causing increasing human and economic losses to its neighbors.
Emirati diplomatic adviser Dr Anwar Gargash said the Gulf Arab states could no longer “stand passively and absorb (Iranian attacks) on their infrastructure”, and the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Qatar, Dr. Majed al-Ansari, stated that Iran's attacks “I can't stay without an answer” and that “a price must be paid.”
The United States tried to persuade and sometimes pressured the Gulf states to join the war, largely to signal broader regional support for the American-Israeli campaign. US President Donald Trump has claimed, without evidence, that the Gulf states are “fighting aggressively” and “insist on being involved”, although they have repeatedly denied it. His ally, Senator Lindsey Graham, warned that “there will be consequences” if the states do not “involves more” in conflict.
However, the Gulf states reaffirmed their neutrality and maintained a defensive posture. Although they confirmed their right to respond to Iran's attacks, they did not establish “red lines” to trigger military retaliation. Although high-casualty events or major disruptions to critical infrastructure—such as water desalination plants or power plants—could push them over the edge, the risk of further escalation from Iran, combined with mistrust of Washington, has led them to prefer, at least for now, a defensive posture.
What are the Gulf States' options
If the Gulf states decided to adopt an offensive posture, they would have several options at their disposal, the cited analysis shows. At a minimum, it could allow the United States full operational access to its airspace and bases to conduct offensive operations against Iran. The US currently operates from bases in the region, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth suggested that the Gulf states had already offered “access, bases and overflight rights”.
By allowing the US to conduct wider offensive operations from their territories, the Gulf states could raise costs for Iran without formally engaging in war.
The Gulf states could also adopt a more direct role, using their own military capabilities. Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates all have surface-to-air cruise missiles, including the Storm Shadow (the UAE variant is known as the Black Shaheen), with a range of about 400 km. It also operates fighter jets such as the Tornado, Eurofighter Typhoon, F-15SA, Mirage 2000 and Rafale, which allow them to strike targets deep inside Iranian territory or southwest Iran without entering its airspace.
Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, provided the US with information about Iran's attack
Moreover, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates possess short-range ballistic missile systems capable of hitting targets along Iran's southwest coast. All Gulf states except Bahrain also have combat UAVs.
These capabilities could be used to destroy Iran's missile launchers and drones as a defensive response. However, pre-emptive strikes would be difficult to achieve, requiring precise intelligence and coordination with the US and Israel.
A more aggressive option would be to strike the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its infrastructure. Iran's attacks have already caused major disruptions in the energy sector, prompting companies such as QatarEnergy, Kuwait Petroleum Corporation or Bapco Energies to declare force majeure. If Iran escalated its attacks on Gulf oil infrastructure, states could retaliate by targeting economic and energy infrastructure under IRGC control. However, it is not clear whether they have sufficient resources for a prolonged military campaign.
Another option would be to participate alongside the US in securing maritime transport through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran's attacks on oil tankers and threats to ships have drastically reduced maritime traffic. The Gulf states have a vital economic interest in resuming oil and gas exports, and blocking them would force them to cut output in just weeks.
Strategic risks: Going on the offensive risks further escalation
Any action – or inaction – involves risk. An exclusively defensive posture could become unsustainable in a protracted conflict, and the lack of a response could weaken deterrence and encourage further Iranian attacks.
On the other hand, going on the offensive risks further escalation. Iran could step up drone strikes, activate allies like the Houthi rebels, or target critical infrastructure. A major attack on targets such as Saudi Aramco could trigger devastating retaliation, for example on Kharg Island, Iran's main oil terminal.
Although Iran has attacked numerous civilian targets, it has yet to cause mass casualty events or major infrastructure disruptions, which could indicate some degree of restraint. The Gulf states, which have built their economies on stability, probably have more to lose from an all-out war than the more conflict-resilient Iranian economy.
The perception that the US is an unreliable partner also discourages full engagement. The US administration's frequent shifts in strategy increase the risk of a protracted conflict, and Gulf states fear they could be abandoned after getting involved.
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The Gulf states are “sitting on the sidelines” in this war
Furthermore, their goals do not fully coincide with those of the US and Israel. The Gulf states are seeking deterrence and a quick end to the conflict, not Iranian regime change, which could generate long-term instability in a country of more than 90 million people.
Achieving consensus within the Gulf Cooperation Council is difficult. Oman and Saudi Arabia have been less affected and have less to gain from an escalation, and smaller states lack the military capacity to confront Iran without Saudi support.
Also, public opinion in the region is largely against involvement in the war, and perceptions of the US and Israel have deteriorated sharply.
As the pace of Iranian attacks slows, the Gulf states will be able to withstand American pressure more easily. The economic costs of blocking energy exports, however, tie their fate to the global economy. Ultimately, the onus is on the United States, which started this war alongside Israel, to either secure shipping through the Strait of Hormuz or end the conflict.
For now, the Gulf states are “sitting on the sidelines” in this war.
