Trump's warning to Tehran: We are not happy with how they are negotiating

US President Donald Trump threatened the authorities in Tehran with military intervention to forcefully suppress the protests. Although Iran's military potential was damaged during Israel's attacks in 2025, a possible operation, even a limited one, may prove problematic.

Israel's attack in June 2025 demonstrated the profound ineffectiveness of Iran's air defense system. A significant number of anti-aircraft batteries (probably around 30 percent, including most or all of the S-300 systems that Tehran purchased from Russia in 2016) were destroyed in the first phase of the attacks, ensuring that the Israeli air force could conduct operations virtually unopposed. In turn, Iranian aviation remained effectively absent, which is not surprising. Its equipment was based on very outdated aircraft: including: F-14 Tomcat, delivered to Iran before the Islamic Revolution – in the 1970s – as well as older versions of the MiG-29 and F-5 aircraft. Since Israel had fourth and fifth generation aircraft, there could be no effective countermeasure.

Immediately after the end of the Israeli attacks, the authorities in Tehran took steps to rebuild their capabilities in this area. Media information indicates the purchase of anti-aircraft systems from China: including HQ-9 medium-range anti-aircraft systems (equivalent to S-300/S-400). The Iranian army was also interested in purchasing Chinese J-10 fighter aircraft. If they were finalized, it would significantly strengthen Iran's military potential (in the case of aircraft: provided that the crews and ground staff are trained, which takes time), but still not enough to be able to talk about the ability to repel a US and/or Israeli strike.

The conflict with Israel has probably also largely depleted Iran's stockpile of ballistic missiles. According to official Israeli data, quoted by the website Defence24.pl, 631 rockets were fired towards Israel during the conflict, of which 257 were attempted to be intercepted. This was achieved in 221 cases (which gives an effectiveness of 86%). In the time that has passed since the end of hostilities, Iran has probably been able to rebuild at least some of its capabilities, although it is not known to what extent (both in terms of missiles and launchers; the latter were one of the main targets of the Israeli air force and special forces and probably about 60% of them were destroyed).

Another problem for Iran are the losses suffered by the higher military command, especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – an armed formation that has been the basis for the functioning of the Iranian authorities since the late 1970s. Many senior officers, including those in the top management, were killed as a result of Israeli airstrikes, but also the actions of Israeli special forces: which may indicate that counterintelligence protection on the Iranian side leaves much to be desired.

Despite these shortcomings, a possible US military operation against Iran could be problematic at best. The number of potential targets that would require neutralization, combined with the size of the territory (1.6 million square kilometers) and geographical conditions (a significant part of Iran's surface is mountains), means that this would have to be an action aimed at gradual and rather long-term combating of Iranian military potential.

It is not known whether the change in leadership itself (if we expect a scenario remotely similar to that in Venezuela) would lead to an end to the protests and political changes. It would probably be crucial to weaken the aforementioned Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. “The regime will likely succeed in suppressing this resistance if it manages to maintain the loyalty of the security forces and prevent those who resist the security forces from effectively challenging the regime's ability and will to continue its repression,” wrote the US think tank Institute for the Study of War in an analysis of the situation in Iran.

In the event of an American attack, one should at least take into account retaliatory ballistic missile fire at American bases in the Persian Gulf region – which was announced by the authorities in Tehran in mid-January, warning the neighboring countries. Some American personnel from military bases, including Al Udeid in Qatar was temporarily withdrawn, just like in June 2025, before Israel's attacks began – although after several dozen hours the threat level was lowered.

At the same time, the status of Iran's nuclear program after the war with Israel is unclear. Although the main goal of the June 2025 operation was to block the implementation of this program, it was most likely not achieved satisfactorily. “The American bombing of three nuclear facilities in Iran delayed the Iranian nuclear program only by a few months,” wrote the American New York Times, assessing the actions of American and Israeli forces. It is unclear whether the program is continuing or what its current status is, and whether in the event of an existential threat to its existence (the June airstrikes were not), the Iranian regime could decide to use weapons of mass destruction (if it has them, which is also not certain) against any of the countries in the region or American bases in the Persian Gulf. This scenario, although unlikely, must be taken into account.

When (and whether) the American operation against Iran will take place depends both on political decisions and on the US having the appropriate forces that would allow it to be carried out. For now, American aircraft carrier groups are staying outside the Middle East region: a possible change in this state of affairs (e.g. in the form of sending at least 1-2 strike groups of the American fleet and a larger number of strategic bombers and flying tankers to this region) may be an announcement of preparations for a military operation against Tehran. – The American strike group of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln has left the waters of the South China Sea and is heading towards the Persian Gulf at top speed – notes Juliusz Sabak from the Defense Portal. At the same time, for several weeks, greater activity of US transport aviation has been observed on routes from North America to Europe and further towards the Middle East. These factors do not mean that an American attack will occur, but they may indicate such a possibility, and at least they will cause a high level of tension in this region to remain.

Currently, the United States has two aircraft carrier strike groups near Iran (USS Abraham Lincoln in the Indian Ocean and USS Gerald Ford in the eastern Mediterranean). This is a force that includes the two above-mentioned aircraft carriers, a dozen (14 or 15) destroyers, two or three submarines (including at least one equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles). There are also numerous air forces in the region: a total of over 100 combat aircraft (including F-22 and F-35, as well as F-15 and F-16; in the event of a military operation, the participation of B-1, B-2 and B-52 bombers operating from bases in the US or Guam would also be expected; Great Britain does not agree to the use of the base on Diego Garcia Island to attack Iran). These forces are supported by several dozen (according to some sources even 90-100) KC-135 and KC-46 air refueling aircraft. This potential allows for an offensive operation against Iran – if Israel (which has approximately 150 F-35, F-15 and F-16 combat aircraft) were also involved in these activities, the intensity of the activities would be correspondingly greater. The question remains open about Iran's resistance to these actions and their possible consequences for the entire Middle East region, also in the perspective of the use of weapons of mass destruction.

Dariusz Materniak