The devil's stub: what game is Lukashenko playing with Russia and the West?

At the same time, Belarus releases political prisoners and declares the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons on its territory. These actions may seem contradictory, but their primary goal may be to partially normalize relations with Western countries.

Poor relations with neighbors

Belarus's relations with EU and NATO countries, especially its neighbors Poland and Lithuania, should be considered very complicated, especially over the last few years. These difficult relations were further worsened by the brutal suppression of opposition protests in the summer of 2020 and the arrest of political opponents (including activists of the Polish minority, e.g. Andrzej Poczobut), and then by the migration crisis artificially created by Belarus and Russia, which has been ongoing since mid-2021.

The influx of migrants, led by the so-called green border from Belarus to Poland and Lithuania, led to restrictions on passenger and goods traffic, among others. due to the closure of border crossings with European Union countries and forced neighboring countries to build dams and border fortifications.

The problem of the Suwałki Isthmus

Belarus's relations with Western countries are also deteriorating the situation in the military area: from the point of view of NATO countries, especially Poland and the Baltic countries (mainly Lithuania), Belarus constitutes a significant security problem: it acts as a forward outpost of Russian military capabilities.

The potential threat concerns especially the so-called The Isthmus of Suwalki: the theoretical scenario of its capture by Russia (in the case of Russia's actions from the Königsberg Oblast) would mean cutting off the land connection between the Baltic countries and the rest of NATO. An additional risk is created by the close relations between the armed forces of Russia and Belarus, which are regularly strengthened by joint military exercises, such as the Zapad maneuvers, which increase tensions in the region every four years. In 2021, these exercises became an element of the Russian army's concentration before a full-scale attack on Ukraine, which, in the initial phase, was also carried out using the territory of Belarus.

Russian nuclear weapons

Moreover, Belarus announces the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons on its territory. In 2024, work began on the expansion of infrastructure facilities necessary to store nuclear weapons, and the Belarusian authorities announced the deployment of the new Russian Oreshnik medium-range missile system on its territory in December 2025.

Lukashenko's gestures towards Europe

At the same time, however, Alyaksandr Lukashenko, starting from mid-2025, made several gestures that are in contradiction with the current line of Minsk's decidedly pro-Russian policy, aimed at isolating itself in contacts with the West. In September, after a meeting with a delegation of the US authorities, Belarus released 52 political prisoners, and the Belarusian leader expressed his will to take further similar actions. In turn, the Zapad-25 maneuvers, which took place on September 12-16, were – in accordance with the declarations of the Belarusian side – on a smaller scale and were carried out at a greater distance from the borders of NATO countries than previous exercises. In fact, the latter is due to limited resources on the Russian side (due to its involvement in hostilities in Ukraine) rather than to the existing political will for real de-escalation in relations with the West.

“In consultation with the Kremlin, Minsk is using the exercises to conduct a disinformation operation. Its aim is to spread the thesis about Belarus' alleged will to de-escalate the military threat in the region, although in fact this operation is taking place with Russia's consent and serves to strengthen the image of Alexander Lukashenko as an equal partner of Moscow,” said the Center for Eastern Studies in its analysis of the Zapad-25 maneuvers.

These gestures, although seemingly insignificant, from the point of view of the last few years and the state of Belarus' relations with Western countries, can be considered a signal of a partial change in Minsk's approach to foreign policy. The question remains open about the motivation of the Belarusian president.

– Lukashenko is in a situation where excessive rapprochement with Russia may create additional problems for the functioning of the regime. In addition to the limitation of sovereignty, there are also economic consequences resulting from the economic slowdown in Russia, which may also affect Belarus, Pavlo Rad, an analyst of the Belarusian and Russian studies program at the non-governmental organization Foreign Policy Council Ukrainska Pryzma, explained to PAP.

In his opinion, without at least partial normalization of relations with the West, Minsk will not be able to diversify its economic relations and thus be an attractive partner for countries such as China.

Belarus seeks to achieve its own political and economic goals, which is and will be problematic from the point of view of its close ties with Russia. – Minsk is trying not to provoke its Russian partners. Lukashenko has emphasized many times that Belarus will be with Russia until the end, Rad added. In his opinion, the overtly pro-Russian gestures and narratives in this case are intended to calm down the Russian side, and at the same time, Belarus is seeking to strengthen its position as an intermediary between Russia and the West.

“This fits into the paradigm of Belarusian foreign policy known from previous years, suggesting that Minsk is ready to balance between Moscow and the West,” the Center for Eastern Studies emphasized in its analysis.

Dariusz Materniak (PAP)

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