Russian drones in Romania and Poland. A specialist dispels the doubts that it is accidental. “A deliberate action. We are preparing for the worst scenarios”

On Saturday afternoon, Romania was targeted by a Russian drone. On Tuesday night, Poland happened the same thing, with more drones being sent to them, on some lowering them. And on Saturday she also raised planes and temporarily closed an airport, due to a drone attack on the border with Ukraine. “Poland is preparing for the worst scenarios, but it is not yet prepared,” says Polish expert Justyna Gotkowska, deputy director of Center for Eastern Studies (Osw) in Warsaw.

Justyna Gotkowska is one of the most respected security analysts in Poland. Coordinates the activity of Center for Eastern Studies in Warsaw – a public tank subordinated to the Polish government, but recognized for its independent analyzes and influence in the security debate.

OSW reports are frequently quoted by press and decision -makers in Europe on topics concerning Russia, Ukraine and NATO's eastern flank security.

“So far, I have had some drones that have probably deviated. Now it is a deliberate action of Russia.”

HotNews: Is there an official procedure in the situation where Russian drones invade the air space in Poland: warnings, alerts, clear instructions for the civilian population?
Justyna Gotkowska: We have a national alert system and has been used to ask citizens from the affected regions not to touch the fallen drones or some of them and to communicate to the police if such drones have been found. These alerts were sent in the morning or in the afternoon, depending on the region.

But in general, this is the first case of this kind, when I had several drones entering the Polish airspace, where it was not a mistake, but a deliberate action of Russia. So it is very likely that, from now, the government will convey some instructions on how to react and what to do if such a case is repeated.

So far, we had some drones that have probably deviated and were found in Poland, in a few cases, but it was not a type of challenge as now. However, there was a discussion about this alert system, if the information should not be communicated earlier. And I suspect that if we have such incidents, the communication strategy to the society will surely change and we will see alerts earlier, and the process will be faster.

Ask for wide civil training actions

– Are there, in Poland, civil defense exercises or campaigns through which people are taught how to react?
– There were very few until recently. However, Poland wants to develop civil protection systems. A law was adopted in the Polish Parliament in this regard. So there is a legal basis, but I cannot say that there have been significant exercises so far. And I think we all expect such protection for protection and civil defense to be organized on a much wider scale.

– Poland has requested NATO consultations in Article 4. But, in the internal level, what does this mean to ordinary citizens?
– Consultations are about how NATO and NATO allies will react and how they will strengthen the air defense of Poland. And I think I saw the effects after consultations: individual allies promised to send fighter jets, helicopters, air defense systems in Poland. There will also be a rethinking in NATO about how to strengthen the air defense on the northeast and southeast flank. (no in the meantime, NATO has officially announced a new mission to strengthen the eastern flank)

As for ordinary citizens, these increased discouragement measures have shown that NATO is united and that we all want to defend Poland or Baltic States. And I hope this will have an impact and we will not see such incidents too often.

“The Polish society is not predisposed to be influenced by the pro-Russian rhetoric”

– And the Polish authorities succeed in “translating” the external messages – for example, President Trump suggesting that it was a mistake – so that such statements do not minimize the severity of the incident?
– I think the message of the Polish government and the authorities was very clear. From the beginning I heard that, most likely, it was a conscious challenge – and this was later confirmed.

The president, the prime minister, the Minister of Defense and others spoke in a very consistent way. And I think it was a message about the unit. In addition, I saw a lot of misinformation coming from Russia, in social media. And there were also efforts to counteract these messages.

-Can you give me some examples of misinformation?
-For example, that it was a mistake, that they were Ukrainian drones, that the Ukrainians did not break down the drones and let them enter Poland, that NATO will not work, that the war will reach Poland. I think there are a variety of narratives trying to make Polish society fear that the war will come to Poland. They want to divide the political class and the Polish society, to divide the allies in Europe and, in general, from NATO.

– But what are the most common messages in Russian propaganda in general?
-The Polish society is not predisposed to be influenced by the pro-Russian rhetoric. So propaganda mainly transmits anti-Ukrainian messages, which highlight or invent problems between Poles and Ukrainians living in Poland, Poland and Ukraine. They say that Ukrainians lose war, that war could have an extension effect on Poland, that Poles should not support Ukraine. These are the narratives promoted by the Russian media.

Poles know that the modernization of the army will last

– From the perspective of Romania, Poland is considered one of the best prepared armies of the NATO eastern flank. What is your approach in this regard? Poles themselves believe they are sufficiently prepared?
– Poland is preparing for the worst scenarios. I think, especially after 2022, it was a clear decision that we must invest much more in the Polish armed forces. The military expenses are around 4%. We know that we must modernize our army as soon as possible. But that's time. And we see that the Polish society appreciates the direction of changes, with all the modernization of the army, but is also aware that it lasts.

We still have capability gaps, for example for anti-drone systems, for air defense, because these modernization programs are ongoing and we are waiting for deliveries. So, in general, the direction is good, but we haven't got there yet and we have to do much, much more. We are in the process of modernization and that will take time.

– And what are the expectations from the other allies on the eastern flank?
– The wait is to support Poland in the demand to increase the defense or to strengthen the air defense through NATO. I believe that both the Nordic and the Baltic countries have done so – and it is clear that such incidents can affect them. I suppose this is the case of Romania.

So, in order to remain strong in the face of Russian aggression, we must strengthen the aerial defense on the northeast and southeast flank and press the allies to spend more, to invest more in their own forces. I think this is, in large lines, thinking about cooperation on the eastern flank.