This is how Israel's conflict with Iran began. “Netanyahu was forbidden to enter”
Below we publish a fragment of the book “Lost Hegemon. The wasted opportunity of America and Trump's revolution.”
Until 1979, Iran was an American ally and played the role of regional counterweight for Iraq ruled by Saddam Hussein. Americans willingly did business with Tehran and had no problem helping him, for example, in the development of atomic technology. The situation, however, changed by 180 degrees, when as a result of the revolution he lost power politically and corrupt Mohammad Reza Pahlawi's chess. The Shiic Ayatollahs, who took over the rule of him, opposed the secularization of the country, considered Israel as the greatest enemy, while America described as “great Satan”.
In this situation, Americans automatically, but not very enthusiastically shifted their support in the region to Iraq. Saddam was a blood and blood autocrat, he murdered his own citizens, and also much more connected him with Moscow than with Washington. Nevertheless, from Washington's perspective, he now fulfilled the useful function of balancing Iran's influence. The fact that Saddam at the same time worked on the development of weapons of mass destruction was not a major problem for Americans.
You can order the book “Lost Hegemon. Watted Trump's America's Opportunity Opportunity” here!
In 1980, Iraq wanted to use the revolutionary chaos in Iran and invaded this country. The Americans officially remained neutral, but actually supported Husajna. They spared no cash and heavy equipment, they helped in intelligence and training matters. Despite this help, Iraq did not manage to tilt the scales to his side. After eight years, the war ended without a clear decision.
In 1990, Saddam decided that the Americans who had supported him so far would not mind if Kuwait would attack. America, however, intervened. She quickly crashed Hussein army, and Iraq lost the position of one of the regional powers.
Neo -conservatists, who in the 1990s shaped thinking about the world of a large part of the American right, said that Saddam was allowed to keep power instead of following the blow and master Baghdad, but the truth was that after the trip to Kuwait Iraq never regained his previous influence. The sudden collapse of Iraq's power and the definitive breakdown of the USSR – both of these events took place in 1991 – they determined the complete change of the balance of power in the Middle East. A new (un) balance of power has been created in the region. Opposite each other were two hostile countries: the Iran and the greatest ally of America in the region – Israel, ruled by the Ayatollahs and the greatest ally in the region.
“Double stopping”
“If Iran's behavior fails to change, in five years he will have much greater opportunities to realize the realis, Arab world and the interests of the West in the Middle East,” Martin Indyk, close to Clinton's adviser, argued in May 1993. The turkey (came from a Jewish family who emigrated from Poland before the war) believed that the most important task in the Middle East was to ensure the security of Israel, i.e. the only ally of America in the region.
To this end, he proposed to move away from the current policy of playing against himself Iraq and Iran and adopt a strategy of double stopping at both countries. America was so strong now and had so many important partners in the region – argued Clinton's adviser – that she could finally weaken both Iran and Iraq in one go, and thus provide peace in the Middle East.
The suggestion of the turkey, which immediately became the official policy of Clinton's administration, went across the long -term American strategy. During the Cold War, Washington provided Israel with military equipment, cash and diplomatic support, but he did not go into direct clashes with his enemies, because he had to reckon with the reaction of Moscow, which usually supported Arab states.
However, when he freed himself from this restriction, he decided that he would take the weight on his shoulders, which was previously carrying Israel. The double stopping strategy included extensive economic sanctions for Iran and Iraq, an embargo for exporting weapons to these countries, as well as military activities against Saddam. The Americans maintained more and more armed forces in the Persian Gulf and thus “manually” guarded order in the region. In this way, they de facto communicated that peace in the Middle East would prevail thanks to their presence and would no longer depend on the regional balance of power.
Why did it happen? Why did the Americans abandon the prudent strategy that allowed them to pursue their interests at a minimum cost, and took the burden of greater commitment in the Middle East? Why did they depart from the principle that “my enemy's enemy is my friend”, thanks to which they could play each other's countries? It seems that the answer should be sought on two levels.
Why did the Americans adopt the “double stop” strategy? Two factors
First of all, Clinton's administration decided that in a new, non -removable era can finally bring order in the Middle East and with one go to weaken its two largest rivals. In Washington, there was an authentic belief that if the “reactionary” countries were forced to change politics, the whole region would become more peaceful.
Secondly, Israel and pro -Israeli lobbying groups gained a significant impact on the formation of American policy towards the Middle East, among which the American -Izrael Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) stood out.
Let's consider the first plane first.
Undoubtedly, the double -stopping strategy grew out of the same intellectual trunk as the strategy of the democratic extension implemented in Central Europe. In both cases, Clinton's administration, conducted by the philosophy of neowilsonism, assumed that world peace would only be possible when all countries accept the primacy of America and join the bloodstream of its institutions and principles. If this happened, then the relationship between countries would eventually eliminate the spontaneity of the action, which allows competition for influence, an element of uncertainty, and above all the possibility that reaction forces will triumph over the forces of progress. In short, Clinton wanted to demonstrate how “the end of history” may look in practice.
In the case of Europe, this approach turned out to be effective because no country has been openly contested by American hegemony. The western part of the continent had some reservations about it, but she agreed with her, the central and eastern part were enthusiastically accepted, while Russia was very clear, but it was too weak to make it more important. In Washington's eyes, the relatively quiet policy of Western and central Europe was proof that eliminating the factor of hard strength and spontaneity actually brings peace.
Things were different in the Middle East, where resistance against American principles and American commitment was much greater and often took an aggressive figure. Arab countries fought wars against Israel; After American soldiers began to be stationed in Lebanon, Iran began to finance Hezbollah; And Islamic fundamentalists from Saudi Arabia conducted attacks on American facilities in the region.
For these reasons, the White House believed that the Middle East transformation requires completely different means than nurturing peace in Europe. Clinton's adviser for national security Anthony Lake, turkey and Clinton himself thought that decisive actions were needed that would force you to “react” to change politics and accept the common principles of America.
When Netanyahu was forbidden to enter the State Department
The second, no less important plane included lobbying groups, and above all Israel himself, whose goal was to identify America's interests as possible with Israel's interests. During the Cold War, Tel Aviv was one of the few American allies in the Middle East. Subsequent administrations considered Israel to protect and help him confront the Arab countries. The Americans did not do it unconditionally, because they were able to suspend the supply of weapons and refine the Israeli leaders, but generally speaking, they almost always supported him.
The situation, however, began to change at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s. Relations between the Israeli government and Bush Senior's administration became more and more tense: Americans criticized the Icchak Samhar government for expanding illegal settlement in Palestinian territory and for reluctance to the creation of the Palestinian state. They even forbade the admission to the building of the State Department to one of the Israeli radicals, the then deputy minister of foreign affairs – Binjamin Netanyahu. In addition, from 1987 Palestinians had been going on against the conditions of the Israeli occupation, and the White House did not eager to give Israel unambiguous support. On the contrary, he tried to get him peaceful.
These were not the only problems of Tel Aviv. After the war in the bay, when the Americans crashed Saddam's troops, Iran began to aspire to the regional hegemon. Tehran did not join the Anti -Iraqi coalition, but unofficially supported the Americans, and this meant that his relations with Washington and some Arab countries have temporarily improved.
The rulers in Tel Aviv decided that this accumulation of events is highly unfavorable for them. On the one hand, they were afraid that the Americans would finally force them to agree with Palestine, and to the other – that Washington would not be willing to clearly take an Israeli in his competition with Iran.
Israeli versus Americans' hands
According to the Middle Eastern policy researcher, Trity Parsi, Israel drew two conclusions from this situation. First: it was necessary to convince the Americans that in the face of the geopolitical vacuum arose after the fall of the USSR and the collapse of Iraq, Iran is the greatest threat to their interests in the region and the interests of Israel itself. Second: Israelis should start peace negotiations with Palestinians, because the success of this undertaking (or at least active pursuit of such a result) would again put Israel at the Center for Middle Eastern Policy and neutralize any rapprochement of America with Arab countries and with Iran.
Israel quickly achieved these goals. Under Clinton's administration, a temporary thaw in Washington's relations with Iran gave way to mutual hostility and contradictory interests. The Americans gained beliefs – also under the influence of Israel's and pro -Israeli lobbying groups in America – that Iran actually strives for regional hegemony at the expense of the security of other countries of the region. Tehran himself did nothing to deny this narrative built by Israel: he was sickly afraid of Iraq (moreover, reciprocity), and therefore he was seeking atomic weapons, and he threatened Israel more and more intensively for destruction.
This, in turn, was more and more convinced by Tel Aviv that Iranians have hostile intentions towards him, and therefore he must come out with the right counter. However, Israel led this counterattack not with his hands, but with the help of the American double stopping strategy, which turned out to be his greatest success.
You can order the book “Lost Hegemon. Watted Trump's America's Opportunity Opportunity” here!
