The bombs are falling, but the oil is flowing. Thanks to China, Iran is making a fortune from Trump's war

It is not easy to determine exactly how many barrels of oil the world champion sanctions evader is currently exporting. Tankers are more discreet than ever, commercial satellite imagery providers have suspended updates for the region, and electronic interference has deepened the chaos in the Gulf. However, our source familiar with Iranian oil accounting records confirms that Currently, Iran exports 2.4-2.8 million barrels of oil and petroleum products per dayof which 1.5-1.8 million barrels per day is crude oil. This is the same or even more than last year's average. In addition, the prices are much higher.

Moreover, Iran's oil machine has adapted in a way that makes it more resistant to attacks and sanctions. Most of the revenue now goes to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the regime's elite armed formation. China also plays an active role, enabling the free flow of funds. Iran's war fund is hidden deep in Asia, beyond the reach of Israeli weapons.

Oil power network

The Iranian oil business is based on three pillars: traders, transport and parabanks. Let's start with sales. As in most oil countries, oil exports are formally handled by the state-owned National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). However, the practice is different. In a country without hard currency, oil serves as financial liquidity. Various government factions – from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the police – receive barrels for sale. Some of the allocations also go to religious foundations.

Many of these people have ties to the IRGC. Emma Li of Vortexa, a company that tracks ship movements, believes that IRGC forces, which manage their own oil fields, are behind most of the recent increases in oil exports. The son and son-in-law of Mohsen Rezai – a former IRGC commander who became young Khamenei's military advisor in March – are to transport a significant amount of oil. The IRGC's foreign arm, the Quds Brigade, controls 25 percent. domestic oil production. Such a decentralized structure is difficult to destroy with airstrikes.

The Iranians know what to do in the event of an attack

During the conflict, the IRGC also strengthened its control over transportation, the second pillar of Iran's oil business. The formation controls both the Strait of Hormuz and transportation and communications throughout much of the Gulf. Private in name, companies owned by the IRGC or affiliated with Khatam al-Anbiyah (another branch of the armed forces) coordinate most freight logistics with NIOC. These include, among others: Sahand (an industrial company), Sahara Thunder (a trading company), Pasargad (a financial group), Admiral (Shamkhani's shipping company) and Persian Gulf Petrochemical Company, which manages the refineries. All of them are subject to US sanctions for operating as “front companies”.

Iranian logisticians are making every effort to ensure that the tankers are safe – the value of the cargo may reach USD 150-200 million. (approx. PLN 560-743 billion), i.e. five to 10 times more than the ship itself. On Chark Island, where 90% of the water usually flows from. Iranian oil, ships mooring at the outermost pier are currently operating in emergency mode. If attacked, they can cut the mooring lines and sail away without the help of tugs. The Azarpad wharf, which handles the largest tankers, has limited the number of active berths to one for safety reasons. Shuttle tankers continue to operate between Khark Island, nearby islands and storage units.

All details about the ships – cargo, crew names and destination port – are provided to the IRGC by intermediaries upon departure. After verification by the naval command of the formation, according to the informant, a special code is issued. As the ship approaches the strait, the crew transmits the code by radio; if everything checks out, a small IRGC boat escorts the tanker through the strait. This often takes place not in the middle of the strait as before, but along a narrow corridor close to the Iranian coast where the IRGC can conduct additional inspections.

Some tankers must pay a fee of several million dollars, according to the specialist newspaper “Lloyd's List”. The ships' transponders are turned on only briefly to avoid collisions and then turned off once they enter the Indian Ocean.

Iran-China cooperation

Even though the U.S. last week suspended sanctions on the sale of a near-record 150 million barrels of Iranian oil already offshore, Iranian tankers are still using every trick possible (they steal data from other ships, forge documents, impersonate other locations) to hide the origin of the cargo. “They think it's a trap,” says a person familiar with the realities of Iranian shipping. Most cargo is transferred on the open sea off the coast of Malaysia or Singapore to legal-looking vessels that deliver the oil to the destination port.

This, combined with a government cap on fuel prices that prevents refineries from passing on all costs to drivers, is causing margins to plummet. Even permitted prices suppress demand for processed petroleum products in China. However, some state-owned refineries are considering purchasing Iranian oil as part of the American derogation, according to our informant. NIOC rents large warehouses in China that these companies could then use. This would formalize China's involvement in Iran's oil trade.

Suspicious accounts

However, the third pillar of Iranian smuggling – suspicious payments – is unlikely to see a similar formalization. Buyers of Iranian oil, whether from China or other countries, settle their dues by depositing funds to one-time trust accounts opened most often in small Chinese banks on the mainland or in Hong Kong. These accounts are set up in shell companies, often registered by Chinese citizens for a fee. Then the money from these accounts, through dozens of subsequent trust accounts, goes wherever Iran wants it.

Some of the funds stay in China to purchase goods imported by Iran. The rest wanders around the world. “The Economist” obtained the names of two Chinese companies used to transfer funds from Iranian oil in recent months. Together with the Kharon analytical company, we found that these companies carried out transactions with plastics producers in India, Kazakhstan and Turkey.

This shadow payment system is operated by special divisions of Iranian companies controlled by the Ministry of Defense, or IRGC, which operate like informal banks. A dense network of accounts – reaching thousands – allows them to survive the shocks of war. In recent weeks, the United Arab Emirates, previously a safe haven for Iranian money, has provided Americans with a wide range of information about banks and companies linked to Iran. This forced Iran to abandon these channels and shift resources elsewhere.

Currently, transactions are conducted through two or three additional layers of shell companies and carried out with “extreme caution,” says a person familiar with the network. The group of Iran-linked accounts that this person monitors had a total of $6-7 billion before the war. (approx. PLN 22-26 billion). It's now seeing withdrawals because trustees are protecting the money by moving it to other places. There is no shortage of safe havens: according to the informant, bank accounts in East Asia, Great Britain, Germany, Georgia, Italy and Romania are still used.

Such extensive redundancy in processes introduces such a level of complexity that money is getting out of control even for Iran's central bank – but they make it easier for the oil barons to capture them. However, this mechanism ensures the continuity of operation of the entire machinery. Until there is a maximum impact on Iran's energy infrastructure – to which Tehran would respond by attacking installations of other Gulf countries – Iranian exports cannot be stifled.

© The Economist Newspaper Limited, March 29, 2026