The debate over possible European nuclear autonomy is not new. It dates back to the dawn of the atomic age, before the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In Europe, only two states have become nuclear powers – the United Kingdom and France – while the United States has built, within NATO, a system of “extended deterrence”.
Great Britain and France the only European countries with nuclear weapons/PHOTO:X
Basically, Washington deployed nuclear weapons on the continent, providing the Allies with a strategic “umbrella.” In the 1950s–1960s, this mechanism functioned as an American “vaccine” against nuclear proliferation in Europe amid the Soviet threat.
Today, however, the transatlantic balance seems more fragile. Confidence in the automatic nature of American security guarantees has been shaken since 2016, with the election of Donald Trump. His return to the White House brought back to the fore an uncomfortable question: What happens if Europe can no longer fully rely on the American nuclear shield?
How the American nuclear “umbrella” works
The current model of nuclear deterrence in Europe relies mainly on the US, with a limited contribution from the UK and the full autonomy of France, which is not part of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, writes Zerkalo Nedeli.
About 100 US B61 nuclear bombs are located at air bases in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and Turkey. They remain under US control, but can be used by host nations' aviation under so-called “nuclear sharing” – an arrangement whereby allies participate in planning and eventual missions.
The use of these weapons is strictly controlled by special electronic systems (Permissive Action Links), which prevent any unauthorized use. In other words, without the approval of the US leadership, the weapons cannot be activated.
In parallel, the United Kingdom has four submarines equipped with Trident II missiles, integrated into the NATO architecture. France has its own, fully autonomous arsenal: nuclear submarines and Rafale aircraft capable of carrying ASMP-A missiles with nuclear warheads.
The crux of the matter: what options does Europe have?
Amid political uncertainties in Washington, European experts discuss five main scenarios for the future of nuclear deterrence on the continent:
1. Maintaining the current model (dependence on the US).
It is the most realistic option in the short term. It does not involve major changes and does not violate the NPT. However, it remains vulnerable to domestic US policy changes.
2. Strengthening the role of France and the United Kingdom.
The two states together possess about 500 warheads. Greater involvement could strengthen European deterrence, but raises sensitive questions about decision control and strategic coordination.
3. Creation of an institutionalized European framework.
It would involve a common structure for consultation and possibly funding, without transferring actual arms control. But Paris and London would have to accept some form of political “sharing” of responsibility – a delicate step.
4. New national nuclear programs.
Germany or Poland could theoretically develop their own weapons. In practice, this would mean exiting the NPT and a major crisis in Europe. It is considered the most destabilizing option.
5. Exclusive reliance on conventional forces.
A massive increase in classic military capabilities – army, defense industry, anti-missile systems. Politically, it is an easier option to accept. Strategically, however, it could create an asymmetry with Russia, which has a vast nuclear arsenal.
Between discouragement and reality
The European discussion does not start from ambitions, but from an increasingly clear perception of the risks. Even if the international order is tense, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty remains the cornerstone of the global arms control regime, notes zn.ua.
For Europe, the dilemma is a strategic one: how much is it willing to risk to guarantee its security in the face of Russian nuclear pressure?
Currently, nuclear deterrence – largely American – reduces the need for massive military mobilization. But Ukraine's experience shows that in modern wars, precision and industrial capacity can matter more than raw warhead power.
An eventual European nuclear autonomy could increase the credibility of deterrence vis-à-vis Moscow. But if it were to become a substitute for investment in conventional forces, it could have the opposite effect: increasing the temptation to act “below the nuclear threshold”.
In this context, Europe seems to be looking for a balance formula – one that combines the strengthening of classical military capabilities with the maintenance of a credible nuclear shadow, without fracturing the non-proliferation architecture.
