The logic of the state versus the logic of resistance. Why the Amal–Hezbollah alliance entered a critical phase in 2026
In Lebanon's fragmented political landscape, the relationship between the Amal movement and Hezbollah is one of the central pillars of the balance of power within the Shiite community. Although the two organizations are often presented as a unitary bloc – the so-called “Shia duo” – the developments of 2025–2026, especially the escalation of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, reveal a more complex relationship, simultaneously marked by strategic cooperation and latent tensions.
An alliance built on common interests
Amal and Hezbollah share the same sociological base: Lebanon's Shia community, concentrated in the south of the country, in the Bekaa Valley and in the southern suburbs of Beirut. Over the past two decades, the two organizations have managed to build a relationship of pragmatic coexistence, avoiding the direct confrontation that violently opposed them in the 1980s.
This alliance is supported by converging interests. On the one hand, Amal, led by Nabih Berri, is deeply integrated into the institutions of the Lebanese state, having a much more nationalist position. Berri has long served as speaker of parliament, and his movement operates as a classic political actor interested in stability and maintaining influence within the Lebanese confessional system.
On the other hand, Hezbollah is a hybrid political-military force with a significant military capability and a more pronounced Islamist ideology, supported by Iran. Despite these differences, the two organizations have cooperated effectively: Amal provides institutional legitimacy and Hezbollah provides military deterrence capability.
The 2026 War: Catalyst for Tensions
The escalation of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in 2026 has put this relationship under unprecedented pressure. Hezbollah's decision to engage directly in extended confrontations with Israel has had major consequences for Lebanon, generating significant destruction, massive population displacement, and an even deeper economic and humanitarian crisis.
Thus, Hezbollah accentuated its internal isolation and created friction including with traditional allies. Although Amal did not cut ties with Hezbollah, there are clear indications that this military involvement was viewed with reluctance in certain political circles close to Berri.
The fundamental problem is that Amal, being part of the state system, is directly affected by the consequences of the war. The destruction of infrastructure, international pressure and negotiations for a ceasefire put Amal in a difficult position: it must support Shia solidarity without undermining the state of which it is a part.
Negotiations and strategy divergences
A major point of divergence between Amal and Hezbollah is the attitude towards negotiations with Israel. While Hezbollah adopted a rigid stance, rejecting any agreement that would limit its freedom of action, Amal played a more flexible role, participating in indirect negotiations and supporting ceasefire initiatives.
This difference is not merely tactical, but reflects two distinct visions of Lebanon's role. Amal operates in the logic of the state: stability, compromise, maintaining internal balance. Hezbollah, on the other hand, also defines itself by its “resistance” role, which implies a greater readiness for confrontation.
In the context of the agreements discussed in 2026, which envisage strengthening the role of the Lebanese army and limiting non-state actors, this difference becomes even more visible. For Amal, the consolidation of the state may represent an opportunity to strengthen its position. For Hezbollah, however, this can be perceived as an existential threat.
Despite these differences, an open break between Amal and Hezbollah remains unlikely in the short term. The reasons are multiple.
First, the two organizations depend on each other to maintain influence in Lebanon's Shiite community. A direct confrontation would risk fragmenting this base and weakening both camps.
Second, the experience of the conflicts of the 1980s remains a strong negative precedent. The fighting between Amal and Hezbollah then deeply destabilized the Shiite community and demonstrated the costs of internal rivalry.
However, this interdependence does not eliminate structural contradictions. Amal represents the state; Hezbollah, a parallel force and terrorist organization. This duality is only sustainable as long as balance is maintained. In conditions of deep crisis, it can become a source of conflict.
Possible evolution scenarios
In the medium term, the evolution of the Amal–Hezbollah relationship will depend on several factors. A first factor is the result of the conflict with Israel. If the war continues or results in major losses for Lebanon, domestic pressure on Hezbollah will increase, and Amal may adopt a more critical, if not explicitly hostile, stance.
A second factor is international pressure to disarm Hezbollah. If this pressure translates into concrete measures, Amal will be faced with a difficult choice: support the state or remain in solidarity with Hezbollah.
A third factor is the internal dynamics of the Shia community. Popular discontent, fueled by the costs of war, could alter the balance of power and open space for competition between the two organizations.
Thus, in 2026, the relationship between Amal and Hezbollah is characterized by a fundamental ambivalence: strategic cooperation and latent tension, and if the war with Israel did not break this alliance, it nevertheless exposed its limits.
For now, the two organizations remain allies out of necessity, not out of complete identity. The differences of vision – on the state, on negotiations and on the role of weapons – persist and deepen in the current context.
In the short term, unity will prevail. In the medium term, however, if internal and external pressures continue to mount, this relationship could enter a more volatile phase where cooperation will be increasingly difficult to maintain without significant strategy adjustments on the part of both camps.
