Without political consensus, Romania risks remaining indefinitely in the waiting room of the euro zone, says the first vice-governor of the BNR

“The adoption of the euro would mark Romania's transition from the status of an economy that strives to maintain convergence to that of a full participant in the European economic decision-making architecture — a sustainable gain, provided that the reforms are internalized, not just formally ticked off”, writes the first vice-governor of the National Bank of Romania Leonardo Badea in an opinion text sent to HotNews.

The political dimension of euro adoption

Badea explicitly argues that the adoption of the euro is not only an economic decision, but a political and strategic one. The Czech Republic and Poland — which could technically meet the criteria — chose not to join, preferring to retain their monetary autonomy. The small countries (Baltic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Croatia, Bulgaria) chose integration also as a geopolitical guarantee, not just an economic one.

For Romania, the author believes that a stable transparliamentary political consensus is a condition of credibility, not just opportunity. Without it, the process becomes vulnerable to electoral cycles and risks remaining a declarative aspiration instead of an actual commitment.

OECD Accession—Status and Significance

Romania is in the final phase of the OECD accession process, having already obtained 24 of the 25 necessary approvals, with completion expected by the end of 2026. Badea emphasizes that this process is the most rigorous in the organization's history — it involves evaluation in 25 committees, compared to only 3 in the case of states admitted in the 90s — which gives the reforms a special depth and sustainability. The BNR was actively involved in this endeavor, contributing in its fields of competence to the alignment with OECD standards.

From formal compliance to structural transformation

The essential benefit of membership is not simply membership of “a select club”, but the internalization of mechanisms that reduce country risk and the cost of capital. The experience of the Czech Republic and Poland shows that after joining the OECD, both countries experienced constant decreases in risk premiums, with direct effects on financing costs for both the state and the private sector. Alignment with governance and transparency standards reclassifies Romanian assets into more favorable investment categories, attracting long-term capital — essential for large infrastructure and energy projects.

OECD integration is also described as a catalyst for productivity by imposing rigorous standards of corporate governance, digitization and professionalization of management in state-owned companies. Slovenia is cited as a positive example: the adoption of OECD corporate governance guidelines has led to increased value added in the state sector and reduced dependence on public subsidies.

Attracting capital and integrating into global value chains

OECD membership opens access to investment funds with strict country rating mandates. Badea cites the case of the Czech Republic, where the stock of foreign direct investment relative to GDP rose spectacularly from around 12% at the time of accession to over 70% in the following decades. Romania can thus become a regional hub of stability on NATO's eastern flank, where OECD economic standards are intertwined with the strategic security partnership.

Fiscally, the adoption of transfer pricing guidelines and tax dispute resolution mechanisms provide multinationals with predictability similar to that of Western markets, strengthening Romania's position as an attractive destination for high-tech investments.

Social inclusion as a productivity reserve

A distinctive element of the vision articulated by Badea is the treatment of social inclusion not as an ethical objective in itself, but as a reserve of economic productivity. Reconnecting segments of the population outside the labor market and making investments in education and health more efficient are presented as the foundation of macroeconomic resilience. The Polish model demonstrates that labor force activation policies aligned with OECD recommendations can sustain increases in GDP/capita above the European average even in periods of external volatility.

OECD as a springboard to the Eurozone

The reforms generated during the OECD are explicitly presented as preparation for the Maastricht criteria. The example of Croatia is cited repeatedly and in detail: its euro accession process was preceded by rigorous fiscal consolidation (the deficit fell from 5.5% to below 1% of GDP), public debt fell from 83.2% to 57.4% of GDP in ten years, and its sovereign rating rose from below investment grade to level A. Bulgaria, although with a weaker structural profile, recorded after accession to euros from 1 January 2026 a positive revaluation of assets and a reduction of the risk premium.

Real convergence and structural constraints

Romania's GDP/capita calculated at purchasing power parity increased from approximately 10,800 euros in 2007 to almost 31,000 euros in 2024, evolving from 44% to approximately 79% of the EU average. However, Romania ranks only 18th out of 27 member states, and convergence is territorially uneven — vast semi-rural regions remain trapped in structural underdevelopment, creating a two-speed economy.
Badea also introduces the Balassa-Samuelson effect to explain why emerging economies structurally tend towards higher inflation than advanced ones — a complicating factor for sustainably meeting the nominal criteria for euro membership.

The lessons of Romanian monetary history

The article reviews the evolution of the leu from 1989 to the present, emphasizing that the sharp depreciation in the period 1989–2003 was determined by the difficulties of the transition, external crises (Asia 1997, Russia 1998) and the lack of trust in institutions. Stabilization came gradually with the opening of EU accession negotiations in 2000, fiscal consolidation and foreign capital inflows. The global financial crisis of 2007–2009 represented a new episode of depreciation, after which the exchange rate entered a more stable regime. The experience of the ERM in 1992 (the UK's exit) is cited as a warning about the risks of a fixed exchange rate regime in the absence of business cycle synchronization.

Read here the full version of the opinion of the first vice-governor of the BNR