Two-thirds of spies in the European Union were recruited by Russia, followed by spies from China, according to a report by the Swedish government agency “Spies Among Us”. Co-author of the report, Dr. Elina Elveborg Lindskog, told PAP that in addition to traditional spies, there were also disposable ones.
The report “Spies Among Us: Espionage in Europe”, which examined the cases of convicted foreign intelligence agents from the European Union, was commissioned by the Swedish security service Sakerhetspolisen, the Swedish intelligence service and the MUST military counterintelligence service. The document was prepared by the government's Defense Research Agency (FOI), which cooperates with, among others, with the Swedish Armed Forces was published in early February.
The authors of the report analyzed publicly available data on 70 cases of spies from 20 countries, including Poland, operating in the years 2008–2024. Two-thirds of them involved spies recruited by Russia, six by China and three by Iran.
New recruitment methods
On this basis, – according to Dr. Elina Elveborg Lindskog, co-author of the report and FOI expert – a “broad” picture of espionage activities in Europe was created, showing the pattern of agents' actions, their motives, as well as new methods of their recruitment.
– Espionage activities in Europe are becoming more and more complex. For example, a single-use spy appeared, used only for single tasks, including: criminals. It happens that such people are unaware of who they are providing information to, Dr. Lindskog emphasized in an interview with PAP.
Taci one-time spies most often work for money and may even think they are performing “ordinary” criminal tasks rather than intelligence ones. This operating model reduces intelligence costs and minimizes the risk of “burning out” professional intelligence officers. The services of freelancers and criminal organizations are also more difficult to link with foreign intelligence.
Contrary to the opinion that in the digital age, people will be replaced by online espionageLindskog noted, traditional agent recruitment continues because “access to secrets” matters. Therefore – as the expert noted – “insiders” are still recruited, experts with insight into state secrets: “typical long-term spies with whom the traditional case officer builds a special relationship.”
However, the recruiters' target is not only “insiders” with access to military information, but also… people working in health care, energy or the food industry.
– We were curious that there were very few women among the convicted spies. There were only four cases. This is an issue that deserves separate study, especially since, for example, in Sweden, women play an important role in criminal circles, Lindskog noted.
Male spy
Previously conducted quantitative research, referred to by the authors of the report, indicates that the vast majority of convicted spies are men. Of the twenty cases of spies tried in Estonia, only one involved a woman. The authors emphasize, however, that it is not certain whether these data reflect the actual participation of women in espionage activities in Europe, or whether it is only the result of the effectiveness or lack thereof in detecting and prosecuting agents.
People of all ages spy. The report shows that the average age of people convicted of espionage is 48, but there are intelligence officers who are both 21 years old and seniors who are 82 years old.
They even search on LinkedIn
As Lindskog emphasized, social media is increasingly being used in addition to traditional methods to recruit agents.
– It started during the pandemic – noted the expert and added that recruiters often use Telegram, which makes it easier to reach Russian-speaking communities, but also, for example, the LinkedIn platform to “find” people for a specific position.
Lindskog cited the example of a Latvian who contacted a group of alleged anti-fascists from the Baltic countries on Telegram because he wanted to help Russia collect information about Latvia's security.
– He did it for ideological reasons. This is one of the motives behind the decision to work for a foreign intelligence service, although perhaps a bit rarer than in the times of the Cold War. Of course, blackmail, ambition and money are also important motivations, but, as our research shows, not all spies receive remuneration, said the expert, although she noted that “in some cases there is no binding information in this matter.”
Recruiting for “sweet bait”
Intelligence agencies also still use honeytrap in recruitment, using information obtained by seducing the victim to blackmail them. However, the report mentions innovation in the use of this tool. Intelligence agencies increasingly use “persons” generated by artificial intelligence, who only simulate romantic relationships, but nevertheless build an emotional bond and encourage them to disclose confidential information.
Russia remains the “dominant” recruiter of spies in Europe. In the report, 47 of the 70 cases examined concerned collaborators of the Russian Federation. In Russia, the recruitment of spies is mainly carried out by the GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate) and the FSB (Federal Security Service), but it also happens to the Foreign Intelligence Service (SWR) and the KGB (State Security Committee).
Most Russian spies were identified in Estonia, with the exception of two cases in which China was the country initiating intelligence contacts.
“Chinese spies seek information in the field of technology and operate in academia,” Lindskog noted.
As the report emphasizes, China is “expansive” and is perceived as the greatest threat in the context of industrial and scientific espionage. In France and Belgium, for example, authorities warned universities and research institutes about the risks of cooperation with the Middle Kingdom.
Anna Gwozdowska (PAP)
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