Why did the Polish Financial Supervision Authority attack Quicko? Fintech NIP in the Russian system
A company from Tarnowskie Góry, supported by EU subsidies, could enable Russians to bypass the blockade imposed on their country by the West. We reveal the behind-the-scenes of revoking the license of the Polish fintech Quicko, which, according to the whistleblower, became an element of the Russian machine to bypass sanctions. In the background of the Polish Financial Supervision Authority's decision, the stablecoin A7A5 and a bank controlled by the Kremlin appear.
On January 21, 2026, the Polish Financial Supervision Authority (KNF) immediately revoked the license of the National Payment Institution of the fintech Quicko. This is a “nuclear option” that does not appear often on the Polish market. This process usually takes months. This time the supervisor acted quickly. Why?
The official statement of the Polish Financial Supervision Authority said that the office's decision was dictated by the “lack of prudent and stable management”. According to our information, this laconic formula may conceal (conscious or unconscious) connections with the Russian payment system created to bypass international sanctions.
The development of Quicko's infrastructure was financed, among others, by: from public money. The company implemented the project “Implementation of an innovative system for handling card and online payments” with a total value of PLN 1.35 million, of which PLN 800,000. PLN was a non-repayable subsidy from EU funds. According to the whistleblower who discovered the case, this system could have been used to bypass SWIFT.
Huawei Watches and Netflix in Moscow?
The decision of the Polish Financial Supervision Authority to revoke Quicko's license affects, among others, in Polish users of Huawei smartwatches using contactless payments supported by fintech. In addition, the company provided its services to many legally operating companies. According to the information we have received However, Quicko's client list could also include an entity that allowed Russians to exchange rubles and subscribe to services blocked in their country, such as ChatGPT, Netflix, Google Cloud or Midjourney.
The whistleblower who reported this matter to the Polish authorities was Andry Lebedev, director of the Estonian fintech Swipelux. As he revealed in an interview with Bankier.pl, the beginning of the story that led him to Quicko was a routine customer verification procedure that took place in his company last year.
Representatives of the A7A5 project then approached Swipelux. Despite the seemingly “clean” documentation, Lebedev's compliance department rejected the client due to its suspicious structure and trading volumes suggesting links with the Russian government. The intuition of experts from Estonia was confirmed half a year later, when OFAC (the unit of the US Treasury responsible for imposing and enforcing economic sanctions against countries, companies and organizations) imposed official sanctions on the project.
Russian cryptocurrency for bypassing sanctions
A7A5 is a stablecoin (a cryptocurrency designed to retain the value of a specific traditional currency) pegged to the Russian ruble, which has handled transactions worth more than $100 billion in less than a year since its launch in January 2025. According to Elliptic analysts, this asset is the foundation of the Kremlin's advanced system of bypassing sanctions.
The official issuer of A7A5 stablecoins is Old Vector LLC, registered in Kyrgyzstan. “Elliptic” researchers determined that the project is actually behind the Russian company A7 LLC, whose main shareholders are entities directly related to the Russian state machine:
- Promsvyazbank (PSB) – Russian state bank serving the defense sector, subject to full sanctions. It is in PSB that rubles covering the A7A5 stablecoin are deposited in a 1:1 ratio.
- Ilan Shor – Moldovan oligarch convicted of financial fraud and sanctioned for his activities on behalf of Russia.
The purpose of creating A7A5 was to facilitate cross-border payments for Russian entities. In the second half of 2025, its creators launched the StablePay service as a new initiative aimed at increasing the usability of their stablecoin. The mechanism of operation of this service is based on a simple scheme:
- the user tops up the virtual debit card using A7A5 tokens,
- the loaded card allows him to pay for subscriptions to foreign websites that have officially cut off access to users from the Russian Federation.
Here we come back to Quicko.
Dangerous connections of Polish fintech?
After the rejection of the business proposal of people associated with A7A5 and the subsequent imposition of sanctions on this project, Andry Lebedev was not interested in this topic for a long time. As he told our editorial office, he recently decided to check out of curiosity whether the Russian stablecoin is still active.
– I was amazed to see them in their “full glory” advertising the ability to deposit and withdraw Russian rubles. I got curious: who is the supplier that powers this? Who does not comply with US sanctions and actively cooperates with such a company? This search led me directly to Quicko, says Lebedev.
In the recording provided to our editorial office, the whistleblower presented step by step the process that led him to the company from Tarnowskie Góry. The StablePay system instructs the user how to top up the card with cryptocurrency (e.g. via stablecoins) to then make a payment in euros or dollars.
During the payment authorization process (Mastercard ID Check), the LifeUp logo appears on the screen. It is this brand that directly handles the transaction from the user's side. It is a “front shop” – a mask intended to hide the real beneficiary. On the LifeUp website, there is information about the card-issuing bank (BIN provider) in the footer. The Tax Identification Number provided here belongs to Quicko.
Quicko denies this. “We do not operate in Russia”
We asked the management board of the company from Tarnowskie Góry for comment. President Grzegorz Mencel categorically distanced himself from the allegations in a statement.
“The company took note of the KNF's announcement of January 21, 2026 and is analyzing the current situation. We approached the KNF's announcement with due seriousness and responsibility. The company has launched appropriate procedures for the circumstances. At the same time, we emphasize that user funds are secured and will be fully settled in accordance with the KNF's recommendations.
Any claims that Quicko infrastructure or cards are being used within the territory of the Russian Federation or to circumvent applicable sanctions are false.“- we read in the response of the president of Quicko to questions from Bankier.pl.
It is worth noting that in the era of digital finance, violating sanctions does not have to concern a specific territory or result from a conscious will to cooperate. It may be the result of insufficient verification of business partners (KYB). If a Polish fintech made its infrastructure available to the LifeUp brand without noticing that it constitutes a “front” for the sanctioned A7A5 stablecoin, this is equally burdensome in the eyes of the regulator.
We sent requests for comments on the matter and additional questions to the Polish Financial Supervision Authority and the Chief Financial Information Inspector. The Polish Financial Supervision Authority informed us that it cannot provide additional information beyond that provided in the announcement. The GIFI refused to answer, citing financial secrecy.
Poland and Lithuania are a backdoor for Russian capital
As Andry Lebedev points out, the case we describe may be part of a broader phenomenon. According to the whistleblower, it is an open secret in professional circles that Poland's Financial Intelligence Unit and licensing authorities have difficulty implementing rigorous compliance controls compared to other jurisdictions. We also hear from another source related to the industry that Polish authorities are not equipped with appropriate tools to detect this type of crime.
– Many companies operating under Polish licenses handle payments for high-risk sectors, including illegal gambling, using the so-called “miscoding” (masking the type of transaction) and facilitates money laundering in its broad sense. Personally, I initially thought that the problem was limited to Polish crypto companies (in Poland it is not even a licensed activity, but only registered), but it turns out that it also applies to payment institutions and EMIs (electronic money institutions), such as Quicko – says Lebedev.
Our interlocutor categorically states that in his opinion the overall effectiveness of the current sanctions regime is close to zero.
– It is still too easy for stablecoins to be used to move money out of Russia because there are providers willing to exchange these tokens for euros or dollars without due diligence in checking the source of the funds. Most of these suppliers come from Poland or Lithuania – emphasizes the director of Swipelux.
According to Lebedev, the reason is regulatory arbitrage. As he explains, in Estonia or Germany, to obtain a license, you have to spend about EUR 250,000, employ local staff and undergo rigorous verification (“fit and proper”), which lasts up to a year. This makes the “cost of error” huge and companies are afraid of losing their licenses.
We hear from our interlocutor that in Poland or Lithuania this process could be completed in a week, at a cost of only EUR 5,000. According to Lebedev, this created an environment in both countries that favored “bush” companies and became the line of least resistance for money laundering supporting the Russian war machine.
– In this particular case, Quicko was used by Russian companies to act as if sanctions simply did not exist. This allowed them to maintain the “business as usual” model despite global restrictions. I'm sure this is not an isolated case – under the radar, many more companies probably operate in the same way – says Andry Lebedev.
