Russia and China have a formidable toolkit for hybrid warfare in the Arctic. Does the US have the necessary capabilities for a possible confrontation?

Moscow and Beijing are moving to turn scientific expeditions, maritime infrastructure and satellite systems into tools of hybrid warfare, warns the European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, which has conducted a study on Russian and Chinese capabilities in the Arctic region.

Sabotaging communications cables, jamming GPS signals, hacking Norwegian ports and universities, espionage using fishing vessels, as well as covert information campaigns targeting indigenous communities are among the hybrid threats already seen in the region, and the risks could increase as Russia and China deploy additional capabilities.

China has declared itself a “polar power” and has the goal of becoming a “polar great power” by 2030. Scientific research has been its main vehicle for access to the Arctic.

According to the strategic view on the fusion of military and civilian resources, all of China's scientific research must be regarded as inherently dual-use. Chinese expeditions have deployed sonar-equipped underwater vehicles in the Barents Sea, installed acoustic beacon systems in international Arctic waters, and tested underwater navigation technologies in polar conditions. In 2025, China made the first manned dives into Arctic ice.

Chinese strategists have been as clear as possible about what China is after.. A lecturer at the People's Liberation Army's National Defense University said the military has the ability to get involved in Arctic affairs through “search and rescue operations, initiating security cooperation agreements with Arctic countries, and undertaking reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering missions.”

In parallel, Chinese Universities linked to the defense industry, including the “Seven Sons of National Defense” network under the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, conduct Arctic research closely connected to the development of the defense industry.

Russia is coming with the icebreakers

Russia occupies 53% of the coasts of the Arctic Ocean and is developing the Northern Sea Route (NSR) to become a trade corridor with Chinese investment. In 2024, a Russia-China subcommittee began to coordinate navigation safety, cargo planning and ice data exchange. Chinese operators have signed agreements with Rosatom to establish year-round Arctic shipping.

The study explicitly states: “Russia-PRC cooperation in NSR development also provides an opportunity to bring Chinese resources into the Arctic to support these various missions.”

Each voyage requires Russian icebreaker escorts and permits. The infrastructure that supports commercial shipping – ports, surveillance systems, search and rescue – simultaneously supports military operations and hybrid threat activities.

Satellites for “information supremacy”

Both countries are building satellite constellations for polar coverage. China's Ice Pathfinder satellite has a field of view of 744 kilometers – much wider than Western equivalents – and tracks ships via the Automatic Identification System. China's BeiDou navigation system includes two-way messaging that allows location tracking outside of cellular coverage.

The authors of the study warn that establishing supremacy in the digital domain and in terms of physical infrastructure “provides capabilities that could enable dominance over the information space, creating service dependencies and exerting influence aimed at local communities.”

Documented hybrid activities

The study lists threats already seen in Norway's High North as cyber-attacks on the port and university of Tromsø, espionage by fishing vessels and drones, GPS jamming and sabotage of communications cables. Russia has resources focused on “maritime special operations” run by the GRU, Russia's military intelligence agency.

In the Canadian Arctic, cyber influence campaigns related to mining projects have been attributed to China, while Huawei has marketed telecommunications services to indigenous communities – exploiting “strained relations between Arctic peoples and the federal government.”

The growing number of incidents targeting submarine infrastructure in the Baltic Sea “suggests that EU member states and NATO allies should be prepared for similar incidents in the future in the strategically important Arctic”.

What does it mean for Ukraine?

Russia's Northern Fleet, based in Severomorsk, less than 200 kilometers from the Finnish border, is home to a large part of Russia's nuclear deterrent force. Chinese investments in Russian Arctic projects, including stakes in Yamal LNG and Novatek's Arctic LNG 2, bring in revenue that helps support Russia's war economy.

The researchers note that Russia's growing isolation “and corresponding dependence on the PRC appear to have eclipsed much of Moscow's historical mistrust of China, for now.”

Thus, the authors warn that “special attention should be paid to Russia and China's focus on disabling critical infrastructure”—especially in the run-up to a potential military confrontation, when hybrid attacks have the potential to weaken an adversary without triggering a direct response.

Moreover, Russia's 2014 military doctrine emphasizes “comprehensive use of military force, political, economic, informational and other non-military measures.”

The US lacks the weapons and technology to strengthen its military presence in the Arctic, experts warn

When it comes to warfare on frozen battlefields, the US faces a major problem: it does not have the right weapons or tools to reliably detect and quickly respond to threats in the region.

For example, it lacks surveillance and sensor systems, naval capabilities and drones, reports Business Insider.

Concerns are growing among experts and officials about U.S. preparedness.

However, if the US forces in the region cannot detect threats in time, cannot effectively position resources and support troops in difficult conditions, the region risks becoming a corridor for attacks that can go undetected.

“If there is going to be a war, a lot of the action is going to take place on that piece of ice,” Donald Trump said Wednesday at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. “Think: those rockets would fly right over the center.”

Thus, he said the island is needed for the huge US missile defense project dubbed Golden Dome.

In the 2024 Arctic strategy doctrine, the US Department of Defense emphasized the need to develop more effective, modernized technologies, as existing systems are not sufficient for the growing threats in the region.

Among the capabilities needed are aerial and underwater surveillance, as well as defense and naval warfare capabilities such as anti-submarine frigates, heavy icebreakers, multi-role surface ships capable of navigating polar environments, and dual-use shipping capability, Liselotte Odgaard, a senior research fellow at the Hudson Institute, wrote in a new report. Infrastructure such as underwater sensor networks, command and control systems, ports, runways and roads are deficient.

“As a result, the US and its allies have insufficient monitoring, response and sustainment options,” she explained. “These deficiencies allow adversaries to cross undetected waters and territories, sustain forces in combat theaters for extended periods, and successfully challenge allied forces in combat-like situations.”

Recent decisions, such as the Fiscal Year 2026 Budget Legislation and the Coast Guard budget, included millions of dollars for new icebreakers, Coast Guard protection vessels and needed Arctic infrastructure upgrades. The Coast Guard's recently renamed Arctic District has taken on a more important monitoring role, and last year the service received its first polar icebreaker in more than 25 years.

Also, the 2026 Space Force budget includes billions for the Golden Dome, especially for space sensors and interceptors, as well as modernization efforts at the Pituffik Space Base in Greenland.

As analyst Odgaard wrote in his new report, parts of the airspace over East Greenland and the North Pole are not constantly monitored, and submarine detection and tracking capabilities along Greenland's east coast are insufficient.

These gaps are worrisome as Russia focuses on expanding submarine operations in the Arctic.

Unmanned systems, both naval and aerial drones, could theoretically extend surveillance over vast areas where it is expensive and difficult to patrol without increasing demand on traditional manned aircraft and resources.

The harsh arctic environment could be a challenge. In the case of drones, it could affect batteries, range, connections and performance. Recent exercises have shown troops that sub-zero temperatures, low visibility, snow or ice and high winds can damage aerial drones and other equipment.