The secret network that allows Russia to keep Iskander missiles in the air despite sanctions
Russia continues to import, in little visible ways, essential components for the propulsion of its Iskander missiles, despite the international sanctions regime. Among the suppliers is a company in Uzbekistan, closely linked to the Mittal family, which at the same time is investing in restoring the destroyed infrastructure in Ukraine, according to Forbes.
The Russian Iskander missile/PHOTO: EPA/EFE
Iskander-M ballistic missile attacks have become a recurring scenario in Ukraine. In November 2024, one such missile struck a block in Krivoi Rig, the hometown of President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, killing a mother and her three children. Considered one of Russia's key weapon systems, the Iskander-M strikes without warning, significantly reducing the reaction time of Ukrainian air defenses.
The propellant – a mixture of fuel and oxidizer used for propulsion – burns quickly and at high temperatures, propelling the rocket on an arcing trajectory before impact.
Researchers Sam Cranny-Evans and Sidharth Kaushal, of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), have documented a noticeable decrease in the interception rate of Iskander-M missiles starting in 2024 — including in areas covered by Patriot systems. As a result, Ukrainian cities continue to be exposed to attacks that cause loss of human life, according to an analysis published by Forbes.
Russia turned to Lakshmi Mittal's brother-in-law
To maintain production of these missiles, Moscow relies on imports from beyond its own borders. Rocket propellant includes ammonium perchlorate, and its manufacture requires high-purity sodium chlorate. In addition to supplies from China, Russia has turned to the Uzbek producer Farg'onaazot, part of the conglomerate Indorama Corporation, headed by the brother-in-law of Lakshmi Mittal, the chief executive of ArcelorMittal. A painful irony: the family associated with one of the major industrial investments in Krivoi Rug is indirectly in a supply chain that supports the missiles targeting the same area.
In 2024, Farg'onaazot exported $11.4 million worth of sodium chlorate to Russia, with nearly $7 million added in the first half of this year. China accounted for 61% of Russian imports of sodium chlorate in 2024, and the remaining 39% came from Uzbekistan. Aware of the vulnerability of this dependence, the Kremlin is trying to develop domestic capabilities, but new facilities are not expected to become operational before 2027.
Incomplete sanctions
Sodium chlorate is on the European Union's sanctions list as a substance that supports Russian industrial capabilities. However, major suppliers in Uzbekistan and China, including Farg'onaazot, benefit from legal gray areas that allow restrictions to be circumvented, says Olena Yurcenko, director of analysis and investigations at the Economic Security Council of Ukraine. Currently, only part of the production chain for solid fuel is covered by Western sanctions, which do not apply to suppliers from third countries.
“To credibly address these gaps, it is necessary to include all solid fuel chemical components on sanctions lists, extend compliance obligations to non-EU subsidiaries of European companies, and impose sanctions on foreign manufacturers involved in supplying the Russian missile program”she explains.
