The head of an information service calls the “reckless” mistake that some employees make on LinkedIn

The general director of the Australian Security Information Organization (ASIO), the Australian internal and security information service, has declared their dismay that many people mention their activity in the information community or in military projects on their LinkedIn profiles, The Register reports.
In a speech spoken on Thursday, Mike Burgess noted that “national states spy at unprecedented levels, with unprecedented sophistication. Asio observes that more and more Australians are targeted, more aggressive than ever.”
“The foreign intelligence services are proactive, creative and opportunistic in the way they are aimed at current and former defense employees: constant cyber spy, direct contact and technical collection,” he added, before sharing some concrete examples.
“A defense contractor in Australia has invented, manufactured and marketed a world -class innovation” and has had a flowering sales to a sudden collapse, he said.
“Customers have started flooding the company's repair center with defective products. Although the returns seemed authentic, a closer examination showed that they were cheap and poor quality,” Burgess said.
Asio investigated and learned that an employee of the contractor “participated in an event in the defense industry abroad and was approached by an enthusiastic local. He insisted on sending content through a USB stick, which was introduced into a company laptop. The stick infected the system with malware, allowing the hackers to steal the product.”
“A cumulative and complete set of information, people and opportunities” for spies on LinkedIn
Another case analyzed by ASIO involved an Australian company that created, according to Burgess, “an expensive and extremely sophisticated military capability, for another country to have a prototype with striking similarities shortly afterwards.”
“Although I cannot say categorically that the espionage was involved, the heads of the secret services do not believe in coincidences,” Burgess said. In this case, Asio knew that an information service in that country “tried to cultivate relationships with the employees of the company” and succeeded easily, because “over 100 people on LinkedIn said they were working on the project.”
Other people involved in the project had published “Specifications and operating details on open discussion forums”.
“All these have created a cumulative and complete set of information, people and opportunities for foreign powers to target and exploit them,” Burgess labeled.
The head of the intelligence services also said that “on a single professional network, the profiles of over 35,000 Australians indicate that they have access to sensitive and potentially classified information.” About 7,000 of these profiles mention activity in the defense sector, “including the specific project they work for, the team of which the critical technologies they use.”
The head of the Australian Information Agency says that the situation provokes “headaches”
“Nearly 2,500 publicly boasts that they have a security authorization, and 1,300 states that it works in the national security community,” Burgess continued, adding that over 400 profiles mentions activity within AUKUS – the defense pact between the USA, the United Kingdom and Australia that involves the common operation of nuclear submarines and collaboration in the field of artificial and technologies. quantum.
“Although these figures have dropped since I pulled the first alarm signal two years ago, I still give me headaches,” Burgess said. “Certainly these people, of all, should understand the threat and become aware of the risk, right?” He asked rhetorically.
“I understand that people have to promote themselves professionally, but to say on social networks that you have a security authorization or that you are working on a strictly secret project is more than naive – it is a reckless invitation to foreign intelligence services,” he said, explaining that “spies from several countries are constantly and systematically scans for information and access to information, privileged. ”
“The spies are given as consultants, recruiters, local officials, university researchers or members of thinks, claiming to come from fictitious companies,” he said.
Suspect jobs
Burgess offered a concrete example of this type of espionage, involving a foreign information service that “used a professional network to identify an Australian with access to people holding security permits.”
Foreign spies “cultivated the relationship with that long-term person, giving them money in exchange for written reports.”
“In the beginning, the requested topics were general-wide perspectives on the bilateral relations and the strategic directions of Australia policy. Over time, the requests turned into pressures, the topics became more specific, and the type of information desired has become more sensitive, such as the priorities of the Australian Intelligence Services,” the head of information service reported.
Asio learned about this approach and intervened before the data subject transmitted sensitive materials.
In another case, Burgess said that “a very aggressive and creative information service has expanded this type of operation on recruitment sites. It has begun to create false online employment ads, offering part-time positions for people with expertise in geopolitics or defense.”
One of these campaigns used, according to Burgess, “a popular recruitment site” and offered $ 500 for “International Politics Reports”. “An Australian sent his CV and quickly received an answer to responding information about Akus and the Indo-Pacific region,” Burgess said. “The company stated that she was particularly interested in 'exclusive information' and asked the person to reveal the names of her professional contacts involved in AUKUS.”
She suspected that something was not right and reported the case to Asio, who investigated and discovered that the consulting company “was actually a covered company of a foreign intelligence service.”




