The French press, about Russia's operation in Romania: how the support from the Şoșoaca to Georgescu passed in the election campaign
The Romanian secret services (SRI) accuse the Kremlin of frauding last year's presidential elections. Russia's operation aimed to take its candidate to round two and win 30% of the places in the Parliament, according to the France.
Diana Şoșoaca and Călin Georgescu Photo: Archive
Russia was identified as responsible for SRI for sophisticated cyber attacks against the electoral infrastructure in Romania during the presidential elections of November 2024, an investigation published on Saturday, May 3, by the French portal Mediapart, quoted by G4 Media.
The attack was coordinated by SVR, Russia's external secret service led by Sergei Narîșkin, one of Vladimir Putin's close friends. The French publication also argues that Russia's operation aimed to take its candidate to the presidential final, an objective that was achieved by Călin Georgescu, and winning 30% of the places in Parliament (gold, SOS and may have earned over 30% of the positions of parliamentarians in the 2024 elections).
How did the Russian operation go in Romania
According to the information obtained by Mediapart, which cites sources from the top of the French administration, Romania identified Russia as responsible for a cyber attack produced during the canceled election. As for the interference operation on Tiktok, it would have been planned by Moscow a year before and should have benefited another candidate.
The operation has been planned since 2023, with the objective of promoting a sovereign candidate who could subsequently stop Romania's help for Ukraine, initially Diana Şoșoaca, then Călin Georgescu, the source quoted shows. After the candidacy of Şoșoaca was rejected, Tiktok was a massive handling campaign in favor of Călin Georgescu. Over 130 influences with 8 million subscribers were recruited to promote them indirectly through videos about the “ideal candidate” whose sections of comments were then flooded with pro-Georgecu messages.
After annulment of the elections by the Constitutional Court, Russia orchestrated a misinformation campaign presenting the decision as a “coup”, In order to undermine the confidence of citizens in democratic processes, a tactic used in other European countries.
France, informed by Russia's operation in Romania
Officially, the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) is limited, in the declassified documents, to mention an operation led by a “state actor”, without explicitly appointing Russia. But unofficially, the SRI identifies Moscow in his shifts with European partners. The information, considered extremely sensitive, came to France to the Élysée Palace, as confirmed a source from a French ministry for the mentioned publication.
The most incriminating element detected by SRI is represented by cyber attacks against the computer infrastructure that housed the servers for the presidential elections. An aggression that targeted over 85,000 cyber attacks, launched “including on the day of elections” from 33 different countries.
To whom the SRI attributes the attack
What the Romanian Intelligence Services have not made public, being now revealed by Mediapart, is that the SRI has managed to attribute an attack that has compromised an APT29 group, also known under the pseudonym “Cozy Bear” or “The Dukes”, a hackers unit of SVR, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, which should not be confused with the APT28 of the APT28 Service of the Russian Intelligence Service. designated by France as responsible for Macronleaks.
After the elimination of Şoșoaca from the race, the French press says, citing SRI, that Moscow was oriented to Georgescu
After at the beginning of October 2024, Diana Iovanovici Şoșoaca was eliminated from the race, the Kremlin had to find a new favorite. According to the SRI, quoted by the MediaPart publication, Moscow would have oriented to Călin Georgescu.
On November 24, 2024, Călin Georgescu created the surprise obtaining almost 23% of the votes (ie over 2 million votes) in the first round of the presidential elections. Four weeks before, the polls granted less than 1% of the voting intentions.
Georgescu has benefited from an astrotourfing campaign (a technique aimed at artificial swelling of a subject on social networks) “sophisticated” led on Tiktok, allowing it to increase its popularity, as detailed by a report of Vigum, the French Vigilance Service against foreign digital interference.
Subscribers and the number of accounts of his account have tripled in two weeks. The hashtags associated with the candidate also benefited from a lightning popularity, such as “#calingeorgescu”, which would have obtained over 73 million views in seven days.
The maneuver was based on the coordinated mobilization of nearly 25,000 Tiktok accounts that became very active two weeks before the first round. According to Romanian secret services, these accounts used unique IP addresses to connect to the platform, and cannot be related to the same network.
