From the state of welfare to street violence. How did Sweden be vulnerable to organized crime bands
For decades, Sweden has been regarded as a functional model of European modernity: a state of well -being, with a consolidated democracy, a robust educational system and a foreign articulated policy around humanistic values. Since the 1960s, Stockholm has assumed the role of “moral power”-receiving refugees from Vietnam, Latin America, Balkans, Middle East or Africa.
Armed attacks on order, on the order of the day in Sweden/Photo: Archive
Today, Sweden faces a reality that shakes these foundations. Attacks, shootings, explosions and custom assassination are no exceptions-they have integrated into the daily rhythm of the press and, worse, in the routine of urban life. In 2022, 62 kills were recorded by shooting – twice as many as in England and Wales, countries with a six times larger population.
The phenomenon has become systemic. And in its center there is an essential contradiction: how can a deeply egalitarian society, which offers universal access to education, housing and health, to fail to integrate those who formally benefit from all these rights? The Telegraph asks.
Organized crime and transforming violent culture
Part of the answer is in changing the structure of organized crime in Sweden. If in the past the criminal groups had a rigid organization (like motorcycle clans), today we are talking about fluid networks, often related to ethnic origins, with transnational branches and an unusual adaptability.
The case of the Foxtrot group, led by Rawa “Vulpea” Majid, is emblematic. With bases in Sweden, but with active connections in the Middle East, the group reinvented the recruitment system: young people attracted by online ads, paid for assassinations, sometimes trained to film during the execution to prove the “delivery” of the service. The term “children's children” is no longer reserved for conflict areas in Central Africa – it defines a Swedish reality today.
More worrying is the fact that these young people come from marginalized families. As diamond journalist Salihu also shows in his research, some come from stable environments, with brothers who have succeeded academically or professionally. The choice thus becomes a conscious one, not just circumstantial.
The failure of integration or illusion of integration?
For a long time, Sweden has refused to recognize the existence of a phenomenon of social segregation. Public policies have focused on the idea of ”a unique society”, in which cultural differences are absorbed by civic participation and access to services. In practice, however, urban segregation has been deepened. In certain neighborhoods, schools are frequented almost exclusively by children from migrant families. The Swedish language is no longer the first spoken language, and cultural references are fragmented between generations.
Salihu, himself a migrant of Kosovy origin, notes a difference of background: “When I emigrated, in the classroom I was maybe 20% of foreign origin. Today, in many schools, the percentage is 90%.” Under these conditions, the “integration” risks remaining a theoretical construction.
In addition, the overlap between marginalization, identity and material aspirations facilitate radicalization. Social networks have become validation vehicles for a culture of violence that rewards visibility and brutality. Here comes a new type of actor: “Gangfluencerul”, the charismatic figure of urban criminality, publicized, followed and imitated.
State response: reactive legislation and political tensions
The Swedish government began to react, but late and, often under the pressure of public opinion. The punishments for minors were tightened. The police were equipped with more resources. Limits have been proposed for the use of social networks in the context of criminal recruitment. And encrypted platforms such as Encochat allowed the destruction of networks.
However, these measures are essentially reactive. Without a systemic rethink of social cohesion, redistribution of resources and social contract between state and citizens (regardless of origin), the results will be limited.
In parallel, political polarization is accentuated. The Swedish Democrats Party, with an anti-immigration agenda, gains land and influence. And in the public discourse, the problem is simplified: “migration is the cause”, without distinguishing between incoherent integration policies, lack of early intervention and outsourcing educational responsibility to school.
A crisis that exceeds Sweden's borders
The phenomenon is not isolated. In 2022, a member of a Swedish network was convicted in the UK for killing a Swedish-Albanese interloper. Others have taken refuge in Iraq or Turkey, where they have citizenship and are protected by extradition.
In an interconnected world, organized crime is no longer a local phenomenon. Sweden is a case of study – not an exception. And the fundamental question, which other European states should ask, is not if they will reach a similar situation, but when and in what form.
The vulnerability of the ideal
The Swedish case is not a failure of generosity, but of its naive application. Humanist values are not sufficiently resistant without institutions capable of protecting and adapting them. The integration does not occur spontaneously, by simple cohabitation. And if the state does not exercise authority where it is needed – either in school, on the street or in the digital environment – the authority will be taken by those who know how to impose it by force, writes The Telegraph.
Diamond Salihu writes about all these without resentment and without panic. But his tone inevitably becomes a warning: we are not in the face of a simple security crisis, but of a possible historical fracture – between the ideal of an inclusive society and the reality of a drifting social contract, he says.
