On the eve of a full-scale invasion in 2022, Western think tanks and intelligence communities made a fundamental mistake in assessing Russian military power.
Their forecasts, which foreshadowed the fall of Kyiv in a matter of days, were based on quantitative indicators: a million-strong army, thousands of aircraft, tanks and artillery systems. This approach frightened ordinary readers, but ignored intangible but crucial factors: command culture, morale, social cohesion and adaptability.
Analysts have misinterpreted both Putin's risk tolerance and the insularity of the Kremlin's decision-making process, leading to erroneous predictions about possible escalation and Russia's response to NATO support for Ukraine.
This analytical blindness partially persists to this day. Many in the West continue to view this conflict solely through the prism of a war of attrition, where victory is determined solely by the amount of resources and the ability to mobilize more people. This is a dangerous mistake.
This war is not just a clash of armies, but the final test of two diametrically opposed systems that have emerged in the post-Soviet space. One system, the Ukrainian one, is a network model built on trust that releases human potential. Most of the changes were initiated and developed here by ordinary citizens, soldiers, sergeants and junior officers. In particular, the transition of the Ukrainian defense forces to the corps system, which was promoted by Azov as a necessary step.
The Ukrainian Defense Forces, especially in units that grew out of the volunteer movement such as Azov, cultivated a command philosophy based on the principles of decentralization and empowerment.
This model is a modern interpretation of the German Auftragstaktik (Mission Command) concept, which was developed for combat operations on a dynamic, non-linear battlefield.
The essence of this approach is that the high command determines the purpose of the operation and the final result (“what” and “why”), that is, it formulates the “commander’s intent.” Subsequently, commanders of subordinate units work out decisions for approval (in cooperation with the commander or independently). That is, “how” to achieve this goal is left to the discretion of commanders on the ground, who are familiar with the most current situation on the battlefield.
After further adjustments or final approval of the decision, actions and operation begin. This approach requires a high level of trust and cooperation between all levels of command. This creates an environment with a high level of trust, where initiative is not just rewarded, but is the basis of combat effectiveness. The unit turns into a single organism, a “family” or “team”, where everyone feels involved and responsible for completing the assigned task.
This principle is not an informal practice: it is the basis of combat manuals that emphasize decisiveness, surprise and initiative to accomplish a combat mission in difficult conditions against superior enemy forces.
A striking example of this is what the defense forces did in the Dobropol direction in the second half of 2025 – this is, in fact, a rethinking of the concept of mobile defense in the conditions of modern warfare. A giant clearing, a kill zone stretching up to 20 km from the line of combat, mixed battle formations, ambushes, search-and-strike operations, fire raids, targeted surgical counterattacks, encirclement of Russian units, hundreds of enemy prisoners.
The Russian system of command and control is the exact opposite. It represents a rigid, vertically integrated Soviet-style hierarchy, where every step is regulated from above. This system was created not for maximum combat effectiveness, but to ensure political control over the army, where loyalty to the regime was always more important than competence. The resulting structure results in operational paralysis on the modern battlefield.
The key evidence of this systemic flaw is the chronic underdevelopment of the junior command staff and the insanity of senior officers who are ready to sacrifice huge numbers of personnel (down to the last soldier) to please the leadership, without deviating one step from the plan of the senior commander, even if it was doomed to failure from the very beginning. This indicates a lack of flexibility in decision-making and a fear of the system to take responsibility so that things don’t get worse.
In March, we celebrated the first anniversary of the creation of the 1st building of the NSU “Azov”. In a short period of time, the corps' administration and headquarters were formed from among combat officers with many years of military experience, who participated in battles in private and sergeant positions back in 2014–2015.
The vast majority of them went through all levels of management: occupying command and staff positions, they took responsibility and know war well from the trenches.
1. With the assistance of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Syrsky, a full complement of corps troops was assembled, which made it possible to fully conduct a defensive operation. All brigades hold the defense in the zone assigned to the corps and side by side carry out combat missions at the proper level.
The problem of interaction between brigades at the junctions has disappeared, which prevents the enemy from breaking through the main line of defense in weak spots and developing success by entering the operational space.
Conducting combat and special training by instructors according to “Azov standards” bears fruit:
- the level of training during the conduct of the BOVP has increased;
- conducting instructional and methodological classes with junior command staff and specialists;
- conducting command post exercises with management/staff officers.
This is clearly reflected in the motivation of trainees and the quality of performance of assigned combat missions.
2. Attached units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, NSU, State Border Guard Service and the National Police perform combat missions on a par with regular units and have become an integral part of the corps. They gain combat experience, receive proper support, and conduct joint exercises and training.
3. In the summer of 2025, the main efforts of the enemy were concentrated in the Dobropol direction, who managed to break through a front 15 km wide and up to 20 km deep.
In cooperation with the defense forces, the enemy’s advance was stopped, counter-offensive actions were successfully carried out to restore the lost position, and the stability of the defense was ensured.
4. On my initiative, the corps’ band is gradually increasing in order to strengthen the flanks, cover the attacked sections of the front and increase the stability of the defense where necessary, which makes it possible to release units of neighboring corps and restore them.
5. With clearly structured management work at the corps level, there are no problems in interaction with the SBS, DShV and attack aircraft units.
6. New staff units have been created:
- 8th Brigade “Garmash”;
- 41st Pilum Unmanned Systems Regiment;
- OPSP “Fog”;
- logistics support units (BMTO, AB, RVB);
- 14th assault regiment (in the process of formation);
- support force regiment (in the process of formation);
- medical battalion (in the process of formation).
7. We closed the tactical, operational and operational depth: reconnaissance, engagement, mining. Enemy equipment, warehouses, PTD, etc. are burning at a depth of up to 250 km.
8. Medical service and support:
- a procedure has been introduced for delivering blood by drone to the front line;
- carrying out evacuation from the battlefield to the NRC;
- Cooperation with leading medical institutions in Ukraine is carried out throughout the year;
- full compliance with international protocols;
- work is underway on a large-scale project to rehabilitate and support those released from captivity.
9. We develop building infrastructure: training grounds, schools, laboratories, workshops, production, warehouses, etc.
10. Corps intelligence, international cooperation, training units, the cornet school and many other initiatives are aimed at scaling the values of “Azov”, strengthening the state’s defense capability and effective management methods.
11. Western partners learn from us and willingly adopt combat experience.
The battle for Donbass is in full swing! We continue to work, beat the enemy and fight for the return of our prisoners.
Glory to Ukraine!
