Dmitry Gudkov is a former deputy of the Russian State Duma and a member of the Platform for Dialogue with Russian Democratic Forces at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe; Vladislav Inozemtsev and Dmitry Nekrasov are Russian economists living in the United States and Cyprus.
The war with Iran has become an unexpected lifeline for Vladimir Putin's Russia. Oil prices rising above $100. per barrel and the easing of a number of export restrictions have made Moscow one of the main beneficiaries of the conflict in the Middle East. According to people with contacts in the Kremlin, the Russian authorities have actually lost interest in negotiations on Ukraine and have become more or less involved in supporting Tehran.
In these conditions, there are renewed calls for tightening sanctions against Russia – in line with the logic of “peace through strength”.
These ideas deserve attention, but they threaten to repeat the same mistakes that have accompanied the sanctions policy from the very beginning.
All restrictions introduced by the West were aimed at forcing Putin or the Russian authorities to change course. Over the course of four years, this strategy produced no results. Many experts claimed that the sanctions would soon ruin the Russian economy and trigger a mass uprising.
However, we immediately started with the opposite assumption: the economy would not collapse, and therefore the only real scenario for ending the war could be conflict within the elites. Moreover, under current conditions, such a split would likely put Russia on a more pro-Western trajectory.
For decades, American policy eschewed the idea of “regime change” — until Donald Trump intervened in Venezuela and then Iran. However, these examples have shown that removing a leader—through assassination, arrest, or exile—does not in itself solve the problem of regime change. The durability of authoritarian systems depends not so much on the figure of the ruler, what about the loyalty of elites and the apathy of society.
Not only did the West fail to engage in a systematic dialogue with Russian elites, it also failed to offer anything to those who tried to distance themselves from Putin.
In February 2022, dozens of oligarchs left for Europe, and most of them (including those who, like Oleg Tinkov, publicly spoke out against the war) were quickly subject to sanctions, deprived of their documents and forced to return to Russia.
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When hundreds of thousands of Russians fled mobilization in the fall of the same year, European countries made it virtually impossible for them to obtain legal status and work—and many of them returned. No wonder even former liberals are disillusioned with Western policies today. The contrast is telling: figures like Suleiman Kerimov, on the contrary, feel perfectly at home demonstrating loyalty to the regime and financing the war.
However, elite consolidation is not as strong as it seems. Only 10 of 149 billionaires were present at Putin's last meeting with business. This may indicate the existence of hidden cracks in the elites.
Moreover, there remain thousands of people in the country who do not share the Kremlin's course but are forced to remain silent. Most of these people do not necessarily have huge resources, but they have the necessary knowledge and competences needed to run the country. This group – both in Russia and abroad – is crucial to any future changes in the country.
The key to changing the system
Therefore, the task is not to mechanically increase the pressure, but leading to a split in the elites and creating a compelling program for integrating the Russian middle class into the Western world—economically, culturally, and institutionally.
In Russia, the final formation of a police state is underway, digital connections are being destroyed, the process of business nationalization is accelerating – and the West must offer Russians real ways out, both individually and collectively. The United States will not wage war against Russia according to the Iran scenario; therefore, the only path to transformation is the internal one, similar to the fate of Slobodan Milošević, who was handed over to an international tribunal by his own entourage.
The experience of sanctions policy and the development of the conflict around Iran show that anti-Western regimes cannot be tamed – they can only be weakened and dismantled. However, this is not possible without the trust of some elites and the middle class. Without working with these groups, without stimulating their distancing themselves from the Kremlin and attracting them to the West's side, it will be impossible to “restore” Russia or ensure the long-term security of Ukraine.
If this strategy is implemented, it will pave the way to creating a more stable and predictable Russia. Otherwise, the confrontation will repeat itself over and over again. Despite all its systemic problems, Russia remains the country with the largest nuclear arsenal, and without solving the issue of its future, it is impossible to build a stable global security architecture.
Finally, if the goal is to detach Russia from China, it will have to start by removing Putin. In this sense, the “Westernization” of Russia is not an ideological project, but a strategic necessity.
I’m Ashley Davis as an editor, I’m committed to upholding the highest standards of integrity and accuracy in every piece we publish. My work is driven by curiosity, a passion for truth, and a belief that journalism plays a crucial role in shaping public discourse. I strive to tell stories that not only inform but also inspire action and conversation.
