A solid argument for the US not to start the regime change operation in Tehran

Will the US intervene in Iran? In the multitude of unknowns, one thing is certain: the conditions have been created for the Tehran-Moscow-Beijing-Pyongyang axis to falter, writes Radu Carp, professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Bucharest. In an opinion piece published today by HotNews, Radu Carp raises two questions: Will the US manage to use this opportunity in its favor? Will the EU manage to get out of passivity and work in the direction that Donald Trump would like to go?
The question of the moment is if and when the US will attack Iran and what the consequences will be. Hard to answer as the US military takes up positions around Iran. The intention of the US is to weaken the regime of the Ayatollah in Tehran. It is very possible that, in the event of a US intervention, the regime will suffer seriously, but will ultimately remain in power.
Two arguments in support of US forceful intervention
In any case, on February 2, information emerged that Iran's president, Masoud Pezeshkian, would like negotiations with the US on Iran's nuclear program through direct talks between Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi and US special envoy Steve Witkoff. It should be noted that the Tasnim news agency provided this information, which was then picked up by another news agency, Fars News, which quickly removed it, a sign of tensions at the top in Tehran about how the relationship with the US should evolve.
To better understand the situation, it is important to clarify what exactly Donald Trump wants.
After the violent crackdown on protesters in Iran in early January, the US backed off at the last minute from intervening militarily. Will he do it now, is the motivation higher than it was three weeks ago?
Donald Trump needs an event to outshine the ICE-Minnerapolis episode. A successful intervention in Iran would be an asset for the meeting with Xi Jinping, scheduled for April. These would be two arguments in support of a US forceful intervention.
“A profound change in Tehran would create big problems regionally, with repercussions for the US as well“
Is regime change in Tehran an important, clearly defined goal for Donald Trump? Hard to estimate. On the one hand, the logic of his actions in the case of Venezuela shows rather the orientation in the direction of the change of leaders and less in the direction of a desire to start democratization. Trump's target is Khamenei. What will happen after his removal from power is no longer so important.
Moreover, a profound change in Tehran would create big problems in the region, with repercussions for the US as well. An Iran on the path to democratization would favor better relations with Israel, a country that is directly interested in regime change in Tehran. A pro-Israeli Iran would immediately antagonize Turkey and Saudi Arabia, which are also interested in regime change in Tehran.
It is not clear how a post-Khamenei Iran will interact with Pakistan. Iran has traditionally maintained good relations with India, Pakistan's adversary. Pakistan has also acted against Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen. In the case of a post-Khamenei Iran, Israel could mediate between Iran and Pakistan, given that Pakistan has agreed to Donald Trump's Peace Council initiative and will most likely send military troops to keep the peace in Gaza.
In the event of a regime change in Tehran, India will play a key role, having, as I mentioned, very good relations with Iran and, more recently, with the European Union.
“It is incomprehensible why Brussels is not working on an alliance with Washington”
The EU could have positioned itself better in the event of a regime change in Tehran, but it did not see the opportunity. Given that a regime change in Tehran would weaken, by ricochet, the position of the Russian Federation and the Chinese PR in the region, it is incomprehensible why Brussels is not working on an alliance with Washington to see how the EU and the US could take the place of the other global actors interested in the fate of Iran.
Regarding regime change, the US would prefer a less radical approach, with the second echelon coming to power. The strategy was successful in Japan after 1945 and appears to be being applied today in the case of Venezuela. The situation in Iran is more interesting, as the Iranian elite has contacts not only with the US, but also with Israel, which is directly interested in how a transition of power in Tehran will proceed.
“A solid argument for the US not to start the regime change operation in Tehran“
An Iran-Israel regional alliance would mean a radical reconfiguration of the region, especially to the detriment of Turkey. It is difficult to calculate the impact of such a relationship, since Iran has an important Kurdish minority on its territory, but which fails to synchronize with the Kurds of Turkey, Syria or Iraq.
The Chinese PR position on Iran is by far the most interesting to watch. The Chinese PR has learned the lesson of Venezuela: it is not advisable to always be on one side, of the person in power. It is much more appropriate to side with both camps simultaneously, as the regime in Beijing has been doing in the case of Myanmar for a long time.
In the case of Iran, the Chinese PR seems to favor the Myanmar-type attitude. The Chinese PR has a very good relationship with the current regime in Tehran and helped this regime against the protesters by jamming the Stalink connections, but seems to have changed its attitude after the recent purge of the Army leaders.
A post-ayatollah Iran would certainly campaign in favor of reducing gas exports to the Chinese PR. This would cause the Chinese PR to have an even closer relationship with the Russian Federation, by requiring increased amounts of oil requested. Obviously, the US interest is not to strengthen the Russian Federation-Chinese PR alliance. This could be a strong argument for the US not to start the regime change operation in Tehran.
One thing for sure
In all this multitude of unknowns, one thing is certain: the conditions have been created for the Tehran-Moscow-Beijing-Pyongyang axis to falter. Will the US manage to capitalize on this opportunity? Will the EU manage to get out of passivity and work in the direction that Donald Trump would like to go?
In any case, one aspect should be noted. A massive purge of the Army at the top recently took place in Beijing. It is believed that those who would have wanted greater involvement in supporting Iran were purged, through direct US involvement. If this were indeed the case, it would mean that Beijing considers Iran already in the collateral victim category and will not intervene.
This means that all the risks of military action to decapitate Iran's theocratic leadership can be assumed, because the benefits are greater, and no one in the region would come to Iran's aid.
The US will weigh all these risks and benefits and make a decision. We don't know at the moment what it will be, but the same arguments listed above will certainly be on the decision-makers' table.
The opinion article was originally published on the Contributors.ro platform.




