Sobczak's defeat was not certain. In early 1996, the first democratically elected mayor of Saint Petersburg did not realize how unpopular he had become. He was convinced that victory in the upcoming elections was due to him by law.
Some of his subordinates, however, were not so sure. One of his first three deputies, Vladimir Yakovlev, was already preoccupied with thoughts about his own future in the Kremlin and began to sympathize with Sobchak's critics, sharply criticizing the state of the city. Another first deputy, Alexei Kudrin, took it as a personal attack and, as it seemed to journalists at the time, did not know what to do next. And then there was Putin, who – as always – avoided publicity and acted as if the elections were none of his business.
The mayoral elections in 1996 were not his first experience of electoral defeat.
The previous year, as regional head of Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's Our Home – Russia party, he nominally headed the party's campaign to the State Duma in St. Petersburg. The party won 13 percent there. votes — less than in Moscow and by any measure it was a national failure. Judging by the appearances Putin created, he treated this first electoral defeat as a formality that had no impact on his political future. He made no effort to actually run the campaign – he hired people who could do the work for him and ultimately take responsibility.
He also didn't initially see the gubernatorial election as something that could end his career. It was only later that he began to share the fear of his more sensitive colleague Kudrin.
It is often said that Putin served as the head of Sobchak's election campaign. That's not true. In those days, there were usually several staffs, which was an amateur solution that inevitably led to chaos.
Details about the main headquarters have never been made public. Either it didn't exist or it consisted of obvious frauds. Kudrin gathered several groups, Lyudmila Narusova, Sobchak's wife, gathered others. Putin was similarly involved but played no visible role. It even seems like he was in a panic. In his eyes, this confusion became the ultimate image of democracy: something uncontrollable, unpredictable and humiliating for those in power.
An unexpected failure
Was Sobczak's defeat inevitable? Not at all. Apart from the organizational weakness and electoral incompetence of his team, he was simply unlucky.
First, Sobchak, usually a renowned speaker, unexpectedly lost the televised debate. He underestimated the supposedly dull Yakovlev, who was in fact a talented performer and polemicist. Putin's reluctance to debate stems from this experience, which truly shocked him.
Then, on the day of the second round of elections, Sobczak's people received another surprise — the weather. A poll conducted the day before showed that the higher the turnout, the greater his chances of winning. On election day, however, the weather was beautiful and people left the city in large numbers, which resulted in 190,000 people arriving at the polling stations. fewer voters than in the first round.
Ultimately, Yakovlev defeated Sobchak by a margin of 28,000. votes and won with 47.5 percent. up to 45.8 percent During the evening counting of votes, a deathly pale Putin paced silently around the Mariysk Palace. History has been made.
In Putin's eyes, this defeat did not affect him because he stayed away from the fight. However, everything he had achieved so far was based on Sobczak's victory. If he won, he would keep Putin as his chief among his first deputies, and thus as a candidate for his successor.
Nothing prevents us from assuming that, over time, Putin would have been elected governor of St. Petersburg in much the same way and with the same aura of popularity with which he was elected president of Russia in 2000 and 2004. However, history chose a different path for him. Let psychoanalysts assess the impact of the 1996 defeat on the inner world of Russia's future leader.
Elite fights
The first success in Putin's Moscow career was a side effect of the fights within the elites there. Just a few weeks after the elections in Saint Petersburg, the reformist, technocratic clan of Anatoly Chubais won over the loyal faction led by Alexander Korzhakov.
After Yeltsin won the 1996 presidential election, even though the Xerox scandal had revealed the extent of his corruption a few weeks earlier, technocrats gained decisive power, allowing them to form the country's leadership. Chubais himself became the head of the presidential administration in mid-July 1996, becoming the second most important person in the country.
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Importantly, Chubais's circle consisted mainly of St. Petersburg residents who favored their own. Putin had connections with Korzhakov, Chubais had no sympathy for him. However, it was most likely Kudrin, who had just moved to Moscow, who helped Putin get a job in the presidential property management department in August 1996.
Later, when he moved to the Ministry of Finance in March 1997, Kudrin transferred Putin to his former position as head of the agency responsible for the supervision and audit of the presidential administration. It was in this role that Putin first became an important player in the intrigues of the Russian elite. Unlike the previous positions, this position could really serve as a springboard to the top.
Putin only became a contender to replace Yeltsin in 1998, when the Chubais clan and the patronage network he had built two years earlier collapsed. Like the fall of the Sobchak regime, this defeat was also not inevitable. However, graduates of the security services turned out to be the people best prepared to build a new autocracy.
The right moment
Putin showed that he had learned lessons from his earlier defeat in St. Petersburg. He then managed to distance himself from his disgraced friends from Chubais's circle in time. It was time for people like him and he sensed it.
As a security service man who was also loyal to Yeltsin, Putin turned out to be the right man in the right place. In just a year and a half, he climbed four or five career ladders until, on December 31, 1999, he became the acting president of Russia.
If the stars had aligned slightly differently, Putin would not have had to look for a career outside Saint Petersburg. If he had never started climbing the ladder of power, perhaps another man from the security services would have become president of Russia in the early 21st century.
Whatever his name might be – Primakov, Stepashin or something else – his political baggage would not be much different from Putin's. Russia would have spent the late 1990s and beyond descending into a long-term dictatorship anyway.
However, I am not sure that this dictatorship would be at full war with Ukraine 30 years later. Not every autocrat is able to go that far. Only someone with Putin's experience and temperament is capable of doing this.
I’m Ashley Davis as an editor, I’m committed to upholding the highest standards of integrity and accuracy in every piece we publish. My work is driven by curiosity, a passion for truth, and a belief that journalism plays a crucial role in shaping public discourse. I strive to tell stories that not only inform but also inspire action and conversation.
