Aleksander Szulga is a doctor of sociological sciences, director of the Institute of Conflictology and Analysis of Russia.
Russia's comfortable sense of being a regional hegemon and arbiter in the eternal conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has given way to frustration and deja vu with Ukraine. What makes Moscow even more irritated is the fact that it currently cannot use military arguments there (even though it has a military base in Armenia itself) – because of the war with Ukraine.
Therefore, it must rely on the famous “soft power” instead of its traditional threats and reminders of military power. However, even the “soft power” tools typical of Russia – in the form of trade restrictions and limitations – can currently play only a supporting role.
Russia has already used all possible threats, and implemented some of them – it banned deliveries of flowers, mineral water, cognac, wines, vegetables and fruits to Armenia. It has not yet carried out its threat to suspend or terminate the agreement on duty-free supplies of gas, petroleum products and raw diamonds to Armenia – it stated that it would do so if Yerevan continues to move closer to the EU, that is, de facto, if Nikol Pashinyan's party wins the upcoming elections in the country.
However, Moscow's nervousness is manifested not only in these steps and uncivil statements of Maria Zakharova.
The main narrative, which is increasingly conveyed by Russian propaganda at all levels, addressing it to both Armenian audiences and its own, is that the elections in Armenia are not only an internal matter of the country, but also essentially a referendum on whose side the country is on – Russia or Europe.
Another Kremlin narrative is closely related to this: if Armenians confirm in these elections that they trust Nikol Pashinyan, it will mean that their country has gone the way of Ukraine, and therefore will have neither economy nor security.
The upcoming elections in Armenia will also be another serious test for Russia's approach to FIMI (foreign information manipulation and interference). We have seen them many times before – during elections in Georgia and Moldova, and probably also in Hungary. In Georgia, Moscow's actions were a relative success, while in Moldova neither the presidential nor parliamentary elections brought the result desired by Russia. Although, judging by our institute's monitoring, she put very significant efforts and resources into it.
Apparently, the same tools are now used by the Kremlin to influence elections in Armenia.
Playing on emotions
In Georgia, Moldova, and now also in Armenia, we see the following elements of the Russian strategy: exploiting society's fear of war and the theme of frozen conflicts, strengthening Eurosceptic sentiments, targeted campaigns against pro-European authorities, and systematically undermining trust in electoral procedures.
Of course, each country has its own specifics. For example, after the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2023, the topic of a frozen conflict is no longer relevant, rather the trauma of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is being manipulated and the responsibility for the defeat is placed on the Armenian authorities, and on Nikolai Pashinyan personally. Meanwhile, Russia seemed to have nothing to do with it, and the fact that it did not help its military ally – well, no one asked it for help.
Moreover, the Armenian Apostolic Church plays a very important role in all this. Russian propaganda uses it to promote its favorite narrative of “traditional values” and the “spiritual Russia vs. soulless West” dichotomy. In general, traditional values and the concept of family are widely used by Moscow in its attempts to influence elections – it used similar approaches in the parliamentary elections in Georgia and Moldova.
In the case of Armenia, as in the case of attempts to cause unrest in Ukrainian society, Russia widely uses the narrative of “pressure on the Church” and “war against Christian identity.” He presents individual criminal cases or political conflicts as part of the “Western program” of dismantling the spiritual foundations of Armenian society. This allows the anti-European and pro-Russian agenda to be incorporated into the “identity defense” discourse.
Using the Internet to spread propaganda
The channels and entities that influence Armenian society that Moscow uses are mostly standard. The main narratives are set by Russian federal channels in news and political talk shows. It is they who convey the basic narratives of the Putin administration, and the remaining levels of propaganda are based on them.
If television emphasizes the “Moldovan” or “Ukrainian” scenario that the West, with the help of its “mercenary” Pashinyan, is trying to implement in Armenia in order to pit friendly nations against one another, we can be sure that we will see the same thing the next day in the Russian segment of Telegram. Various types of war bloggers, Z-channels and specialized websites devoted to the Caucasus disseminate relevant news quickly and widely.
The article continues below the video
Whether it's the Armenia-EU summit, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's speech in Yerevan during the European Political Community summit, Pashinyan's reluctance to attend the EAWU (Eurasian Economic Union) summit, constitutional reform, or anything else. Telegram serves as a conduit for accelerated dissemination and radicalization of narratives.
Armenian media and political platforms aimed at the Russian-speaking audience also play an important role. Through them, the positions of local opposition politicians, Church representatives and former state activists are expressed, often in coordination with Russian expert and media structures.
Manipulating the diaspora
Finally, the Armenian diaspora in Russia plays a special role in promoting the Russian narrative. These organizations provide additional infrastructure of influence by organizing public events, forums, expert discussions and statements regarding the future of Armenian-Russian relations. These structures are becoming an important channel for political mobilization and dissemination of pro-Russian narratives among part of the Armenian audience.
A characteristic feature of the current election campaign is the Kremlin's “nervousness” and a direct ultimatum given to representatives of the Armenian diaspora in Russia.: Either you try your hardest to influence the election of a Moscow-friendly parliament, or your earning potential here will be drastically limited. The problems of the Azerbaijani diaspora can be cited as an example.
Despite Russia using mostly standard methods in trying to influence the electoral process in Armenia, these elections will be unusual for it. First, they may perpetuate Russia's loss of the South Caucasus and set a bad example for Central Asia. Secondly, the Russian Federation itself, through its propaganda and ultimatums, turned these elections into a kind of referendum on Armenia's European integration.
Thirdly, the Kremlin cannot afford another failure after the fiasco in Moldova and Hungary. It is obvious to everyone that Russia is making great efforts to prevent Nikol Pashinyan from remaining as prime minister, or at least not to allow him to obtain the mandate of a large majority. Therefore, there are more and more dire predictions about the economic and cultural decline of Armenia if it chooses a pro-European course. In this narrative, the very maintenance of statehood is questionable.
I’m Ashley Davis as an editor, I’m committed to upholding the highest standards of integrity and accuracy in every piece we publish. My work is driven by curiosity, a passion for truth, and a belief that journalism plays a crucial role in shaping public discourse. I strive to tell stories that not only inform but also inspire action and conversation.
