SAFE procurement rules, originally designed for emergency situations, are increasingly perceived as limiting competition in favor of certain suppliers. In this context, the proposed amendments raise additional concerns, as they could allow the reconfiguration of results by creating cross-cutting frameworks between programs and by aggregating location obligations, which would have the effect of weakening competition at project level and diminishing industrial commitments.
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At the same time, it is essential that decisions on critical military capabilities remain independent of political influences and be based on transparent and competitive assessments, so as to serve both national security and long-term economic interests.
Romania's defense procurement framework, based on the European SAFE instrument, is being re-examined, not because of its objectives, but because of how the rules continue to evolve. What began as an emergency mechanism, designed to speed up defense procurement, turned, in a relatively short time, into a highly centralized system.
The emergency ordinance adopted in November 2025 to implement the EU's SAFE instrument was, in principle, intended to allow rapid acquisitions in response to urgent security needs. It introduced streamlined procedures, including negotiated procurement without prior publication, and established a centralized coordination mechanism, led by the Prime Minister's Office, to speed up decision-making and ensure alignment between defense and industrial priorities.
However, from the outset, the structure raised questions about the possibility of favoring, even indirectly, a small group of established European suppliers, especially those already positioned within SAFE-aligned industrial structures. Through its emphasis on speed, centralized coordination, and predefined frameworks for cooperation, the system risked restricting competition, not necessarily through explicit exclusion, but through the way the process itself was designed.
From competition to pre-alignment
The last proposed amendment indicates a continuation and an emphasis of this direction. In essence, the proposal introduces several new elements:
A first amendment would allow the authorities to designate “one or more suppliers” from the outset and enter into a “cooperation agreement” with them (eg affiliated economic operators) for one or more SAFE projects financed in Romania. This could allow the creation of a broad, transversal framework between programs, prior to the definition of individual contracts. This represents a structural escalation of the existing model, moving from facilitating acquisitions to reconfiguring outcomes.
More critically, the amendment is understood to introduce a mechanism that allows a single provider to participate in multiple programs while aggregating location obligations. Under the current rules, localization thresholds, usually around 60%, apply at the project level. However, by allowing these requirements to be combined between programs, a supplier could concentrate localization in certain projects, delivering others largely outside of Romania.
In such a structure, compliance risks becoming formal rather than substantive, meeting aggregate thresholds on paper but weakening industrial participation at the project level. In order to prevent circumvention of localization requirements, selected suppliers should be obliged, with each order, to progressively expand their presence in the real economy in Romania. This would dilute the original intention of SAFE, which is to ensure real, balanced localization and concrete industrial value in Romania for each program.
Second, the amendment would open a legal avenue for increasing the value of contracts after award, including through adjustments where quantities are reduced and prices are increased. And we are already seeing this: just yesterday, the Minister of Defense publicly stated that some suppliers submitted an initial offer, and later, after discussions and when the contract was to be ready for signing, they came back with a 30% increase over the original price. Exactly the type of situation that occurs when there is no real competition.
“We started the talks, and this is a new element that I'm announcing, when we started the talks around SAFE, there were some private ammunition manufacturers who announced a price. Now, when we're going to sign the contracts, they're coming back to us with about 30% more. That extra 30% is on top of what they announced on their own initiative. We're not going to accept that“, said Radu Miruță, the Minister of Defense. Even if he did not name any company, it can be assumed that it could be Rheinmetall, being the sure company that benefited from signing a memorandum with the Government of Romania.
The minister continued and said that he will not give in to the pressure: “The private sector cannot push us to accept higher prices just because we have to sign the contract by the end of May 2026.”
Third, if an individual contract is not signed by May 30, 2026, the Romanian authorities can either cancel the procedure without payment of compensation, or turn it into a joint procurement contract by December 31, 2027. Although, at first glance, this option might seem to maintain the program, in practice it could lead to the gradual, or even complete, erosion of Romania's localization goals, as industrial development and delivery deadlines (up to on 31 December 2030 under the SAFE Regulation) become increasingly difficult to meet with each delay.
Public expectations go in the opposite direction
This evolution is all the more relevant when it is analyzed in relation to the current public perception in Romania. Recent data from the National Security Barometer indicate that almost 70% of Romanians believe that domestic defense production should be prioritized over foreign purchases. More than three-quarters support using SAFE funds in ways that generate tangible economic benefits to the country, jobs, industrial development and long-term resilience.
These results point to a broader shift in perception. Defense spending is no longer seen exclusively through the lens of security, but also as a strategic tool for national industrial development. In this context, procurement is expected to strengthen domestic capabilities, retain economic value in the country and build long-term resilience.
At the same time, there are concerns that the benefits of SAFE funds could be concentrated among a limited number of established European providers. This creates an increasingly visible discrepancy between public expectations and policy direction.
Less competition, no real speed advantage
From an industry perspective, the implications are significant. Romania currently has access to a wide range of defense partners, globally competitive. But in a system where supplier designation can precede competition, these alternatives run the risk of being excluded not on the basis of capacity, but on the basis of how the process is designed.
If requirements are adjusted or information requests are not released equally, procurement results may reflect structural alignment rather than true assessment. Over time, this not only undermines confidence in the process, but also reduces Romania's bargaining power in terms of price, delivery times, technology transfer and industrial participation.
The main justification for this model was speed. Centralized and negotiated purchases are presented as necessary to meet urgent deadlines. But this argument becomes difficult to sustain if the favored suppliers are not the ones that can deliver the fastest. In such situations, urgency begins to seem more like a justification than a real necessity.
If competition is reduced and speed is not clearly demonstrated, the rationale for avoiding open proceedings becomes increasingly difficult to defend. What is presented as a trade-off, speed at the expense of competition, begins to seem less of a necessity and more of a design choice. The question becomes inevitable: if the system offers neither real competition nor speed, what is actually the priority?
Governance, credibility and national interest
At its core, this is an issue of fairness and trust. A system that allows for early alignment of suppliers, adjustment of requirements and centralized decisions has difficulty demonstrating that results are established on fair and transparent bases.
The SAFE instrument was designed to strengthen Europe's defense industrial base through rapid and coordinated investment. But speed alone is not enough. Without transparency, competition and alignment with national economic interests, the long-term value of these investments can be diminished. Romania is now faced with a clear choice: it can opt for rapid acquisitions through increasingly controlled mechanisms, or it can maintain a competitive framework that supports both the development of capabilities and the industry.
Without this balance, what is gained in speed risks being lost in confidence, and ultimately in the national interest.
