Putin's Oreshnik Missile and Ivan the Terrible's Cannons: How Moscow Uses the Wonder Weapons Myth

Throughout history, authoritarian leaders have often been obsessed with two recurring ideas: the expansion of power and the possession of a decisive weapon capable of intimidating opponents. Past experience shows, however, that these “miracle weapons” have rarely delivered the promised strategic advantage.

Oresnik rocket/PHOTO:X

Before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin had built part of his image of force around an arsenal of missiles presented as highly accurate and impossible to intercept — weapons frequently described in official discourse by the now-famous phrase “no analogue”.

Among them was the Kinjal hypersonic aeroballistic missile, promoted by the Kremlin as invulnerable. In May 2023, however, this myth was seriously shaken, when Ukrainian forces announced that they had shot down such a missile for the first time with the help of the American Patriot system. Since then, the Kinjal remains a dangerous weapon, but its aura of invincibility has been lost.

A new symbol of intimidation

In the fall of 2024, the Kremlin began promoting a new system: the Oreshnik intercontinental ballistic missile, used in attacks on Ukrainian cities such as Dnipro and Lviv. Although the missile could not be intercepted, its effectiveness without a nuclear warhead is considered limited even by pro-regime Russian analysts.

Nevertheless, Oreșnik continues to play a central role in Moscow's rhetoric. For many experts, it is not just a military weapon, but a psychological tool meant to convey a message of strength and inevitability.

Military historian Oleg Malcenko observes, in pravda.ua, a clear parallel with the past: “It is an old technique, used since the time of the tsars – intimidation through demonstrations of symbolic power, sometimes greatly exaggerated.”

The giant cannons of medieval Moscow

A classic example is the so-called “tsar cannon”, associated with Russia of the 14th–15th centuries. In the age of artillery in Europe, states that had cannons had a clear advantage, both defensively and offensively. Moscow, then lagging behind Western technological centers, turned to foreign craftsmen to build its own spectacular weapons.

Ivan III, considered the founder of Muscovite expansionism, brought Italian craftsmen to the capital to produce large cannons. Some of these were functional and were actually used in combat. Others, however, had a predominantly symbolic role.

In 1472, Ivan III married Sophia Palaeologus, the niece of Constantine XI, the last emperor of Byzantium. Having created the coat of arms of Moscow as a two-headed eagle of the Byzantine type, the Tsar declared his claims to the inheritance of Constantinople. But to realize the imperial ambitions, which later led to the formula “Moscow – the Third Rome”, and for further expansion, weapons were needed.

During the reign of Ivan the Terrible, artillery became a separate type of the Muscovite army and a real force, which helped to conquer Kazan in 1552, ending the history of the Kazan Khanate. He also helped conquer Polotsk in 1563 during the Livonian War.

Ivan the Terrible relied not only on the quantity, but also on the quality of weapons, which, with the help of European craftsmen, local artillerymen learned to produce. The chariot also needed highly visible cannons to personify its majesty. So that the enemies, at a single sight of them, surrender their cities, or dare not attack the possessions of Moscow.

The most famous example is the tsar cannon made in 1586 by the craftsman Andrei Ciohov, by order of Tsar Feodor I (youngest son of Ivan the Terrible.). Although impressive in size and decoration, historians and engineers agree that the weapon was never used in combat. Rather, it served as a tool of intimidation and propaganda, being shown to foreign envoys to suggest colossal military power.

Wonder weapons and their limits

Modern history offers many similar examples. In the First World War, Germany invested in gigantic cannons such as the “Great Bertha” or the “Paris Cannon”, capable of striking from tens or even hundreds of kilometers. Although they caused panic, these weapons did not change the course of the war.

Later, the Nazi regime relied on the concept of the Wunderwaffe – miracle weapons that were supposed to ensure final victory. Neither the Dora and Gustav guns nor the V-1 and V-2 rockets could prevent Germany's defeat.

With the advent of nuclear weapons, the idea of ​​giant artillery lost its military relevance. The modern defense industry has turned to scalable technologies and integrated systems. However, Russia seems to periodically return to archaic symbols of strength.

A rather ideological weapon

“The Oreshnik is largely an ideological weapon, just as the Tsar Cannon once was,” says Malcenko. “Contemporary Russia retains imperial traits and a way of thinking that privileges grandiose symbols. The question is whether this will ensure its long-term survival.”

He compares the situation with empires that managed to adapt – such as the British or the Ottoman – and others that did not.

Although the military effectiveness of these “miracle weapons” may be debatable, their ability to influence mentalities should not be underestimated. An often cited example is the copy of the tsar cannon installed in 2001 in Donetsk, which has become a local symbol. For a part of the population, this monument contributed to the consolidation of an identity oriented towards Moscow rather than Kiev.

History suggests that gigantic weapons may impress the eye, but they rarely decide the fate of wars. Ultimately, conflicts are won or lost by people, not myths.