Europe is waking up from the American dream. As the U.S. changes course, the rest of the alliance must find its own. “Act like never before” [OPINIA]
When it comes to the war in Ukraine, all forecasts become obsolete quickly. One moment, US President Donald Trump is acting like an emissary of Vladimir Putin, the next he is listening intently to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky — and then he is back in the Kremlin camp.
At a time when the American administration is increasingly looking like an unreliable intermediary rather than a reliable ally, Europe finds itself in a position that is difficult to describe as anything other than deplorable.
And what caught my eye most during the fall security briefings and conferences I attended in Berlin and other cities was the level of alarm. In most cases, however, it remains carefully hidden behind closed doors.
One of the few silver linings is that the E3 countries – Germany, France and the UK – are trying to face this frosty reality with a united front. After the trauma of Brexit and years of mutual barbs between former Chancellor Olaf Scholz and President Emmanuel Macron, the political climate has clearly changed – because he simply had to.
If Europe is to survive a possible future attack by Russia – and this is what is beginning to be said – its biggest players must act like never before.
They must be “glued” to each other, almost inseparable.
As more than a dozen officials emphasized in the talks, the cost of inaction would be much higher than the current cost of supporting Ukraine. Not only would Putin feel emboldened to take further action, but Europe would be flooded with a wave of Ukrainian refugees on a scale larger than anything we have ever experienced.
This new configuration was evident throughout the recent state visit of German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier to Great Britain, when he and King Charles emphasized the “deep bond” between the two countries – a bond further strengthened by the common threat from Russian expansionism.
Coalition of the “surrounded”, not the “willing”
Meanwhile, at the government level, work is in progress. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz clearly have common ground – they share a similar assessment of threats in foreign policy and similar domestic problems. The Prime Minister from the left of center and the Chancellor from the right of center find a community of interests in the double pressure they find themselves under.
It is the loss of confidence that the United States will come to the rescue in times of need that forces this new political configuration.
Of course, none of these countries will publicly admit how difficult the situation is, but “we see what cannot be said.”
Just compare Trump's September visit – full of tension, stiff smiles and hysterical pleasantries from his hosts – with the relaxed, cordial atmosphere of Steinmeier's visit.
The issue of security overshadows all other issues – although it is no longer a “coalition of the willing” but rather a “coalition of the surrounded.” As one German security official, speaking anonymously, put it: – If the Americans start acting as mediators between Russia and Europe, they cease to see themselves as partners within NATO.
In practice, the U.S. is still the alliance's driving force — at least theoretically. As another German military officer noted: — The brutal truth is that Europe does not yet have the operational readiness needed to repel Russian aggression. Until this changes we are stuck with the United States as the last line of defense.
Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump in Alaska, August 15, 2025.Andrew Harnik / Staff / Getty Images
This signal should have been read already in February, when US Vice President JD Vance threw several political “grenades” during the Munich Security Conference: he attacked European democracies, praised the extreme Alternative for Germany and announced that the US no longer felt bound by its former alliances. The real mystery is that anyone is still surprised by the Trump administration's subsequent actions.
“Peace” is more dangerous than war
Even now, some are still under the illusion that this is not a uniform Washington position and that other members of the administration have something else to say. German and British security experts see it very differently, but many politicians – and much of the public – still do not understand how serious the situation has become.
After the publication of Trump's first National Security Strategy, their concerns increased. The document, which was released just a few days ago, condemns many of the liberal values that underpin European democracy, while at the same time praising the nationalist rhetoric of the far right – indirectly, also Putin's.
Until now, the dominant narrative about Europe has focused on German caution – whether out of post-war guilt, pacifism, or plain lethargy.
Today it has been replaced by a new sense of determination – but how deep does this change go?
The obligation of NATO countries to increase defense spending to 5%. GDP – of which 1.5 percent can be allocated to “critical infrastructure” – it opens the field for creative accounting. But Germany, thanks to its greater debt capacity, has freedom that others can only envy. Great Britain is struggling with much more serious financial problems, and although Starmer talks tough, some arms companies suspect that stalling with orders.
According to current forecasts:
- Germany is to spend EUR 153 billion annually (approx. PLN 666 billion) on defense until 2029,
- France plans to reach EUR 80 billion (approx. PLN 348 billion) in 2030,
- and Great Britain spends 60 billion pounds (approx. PLN 306 billion) today, with this amount expected to increase to 87 billion pounds (approx. PLN 444 billion) by 2030.
However, according to current forecasts, London will achieve its target of 3.5%. GDP only in 2035
For the governments in London and Paris, budgets are so tight and public service needs so enormous – not to mention interest on the debt – that the tension between this spending and defense needs will only increase over time.
At the same time – depending on the country and how the questions are asked – more and more defense experts fear that
if Ukraine is pressed hard enough to accept some Trump-Putin dirty deal, public support for increasing military spending will begin to decline.
“Mission accomplished” will be the common narrative. The problem is that it won't.
Europe must say it loudly
For Putin this is impossible. The Russian leader has linked his political survival, power structure and the country's economy to the narrative of the Western “threat” surrounding him. Hence his recent words that Russia is “ready” for war if Europe wants it – he simply cannot afford to stop threatening.
Meanwhile, the original 28-point plan for Ukraine is an absolute nightmare for Europe. If any dubious “peace” agreement were to be imposed in his image, Germany, Britain, France and other European allies – including Poland, Finland, the Baltic states, the Nordic countries and (somewhat more cautiously) Italy – would know that they were left to their own devices.
It would be a return to the politics of great powers – something like Yalta 2.0. This would mean consolidating the process of “de-Americanization” of NATO, Ukraine's permanent inability to defend itself and confirming that, from the US point of view, Russia has a veto over European security.
“We say it's an existential issue, but we're not yet acting as if it is,” said one British defense official. The task for Merz, Starmer and Macron is therefore to recognize – and tell their citizens directly – that they only have each other.
