Kremlin's plan for the Republic of Moldova: repeat Georgian scenario after the September elections

At the meeting of the European Council, the 27 EU leaders expressed their firm support for Chisinau's decision to join the Union. However, Russia will try to interfere this path, influencing the parliamentary elections of September this year.

Chisinau, the test of the Moscow's misinformation machine. Photo: Archive
This autumn is announced intensely not only on the battlefields of the Russian-Ukrainian war, but also on the fronts of the hybrid war carried by the Kremlin against the West. The parliamentary elections in the Republic of Moldova will represent one of the most decisive confrontations in this hybrid war. A victory of a Eurosceptic position could slow down or even completely derail the European path of Moldova.
The intense focus of Russian propagandists on Chisinau became obvious during the presidential elections of 2024. The first round, which coincided with the referendum on European integration, is extremely relevant in this regard.
Of the 482 sources that reported about the elections in the Republic of Moldova during the electoral process, 150 telegram channels were compromised. Their activity was directly related to the Kremlin, who aimed to influence the media through misinformation campaigns and attempts to handle public opinion. Basically, one third of the sources that informed about the presidential elections in the neighboring country were uncertain.
The monitoring of similar influence campaigns carried out between 2024–2025 by the Institute for the Study of Conflicts and Analysis of Russia (ICAR) show that Moscow's compromised and affiliated sources have had a much more intense activity than in other operations of political influence.
Pro-Russian parliament
Russia has every reason to try, at least, to slow down the process of accession of the Republic of Moldova to the EU. If he manages to impose a puppet parliament, the so-called “Georgian scenario will begin.” While Russia is struggling, without success, to turn Ukraine into a puppet state, such as Belarus, the division and destabilization of Chisinau, as it has done in the case of Tbilisi, its objectives remain.
The severity of the Kremlin's commitment and the substantial resources allocated to this effort were highlighted after two months of monitoring the pre -electoral landscape in the Republic of Moldova.
Between April 15 and June 15, 2025, ICAR collaborated with Moldovan partners from the Watchdog.md community for the achievement of nine weekly sessions for monitoring the attempts Russian to hijack the electoral process and to influence the country's internal policy.
The purpose of monitoring was to identify the main propagandistic narratives and prominent actors who deform the political reality of Moldova in favor of the Kremlin agenda. The researchers collected data from Russian telegram channels, using automated tools based on artificial intelligence, complemented by manual analysis.
The main conclusion of the ICAR report is that Moscow simultaneously funds several political projects to maximize its chances of obtaining a pro-Russian parliament in the autumn of this year. These operations targeted the former presidents Vladimir Voronin and Igor Dodon, ex-prime minister Vasile Tarlev, the former anti-corruption prosecutor Victoria Furtuna and even the mayor of Chisinau, Ion Ceban, apparently pro-European.
Ilan Șor, the fugitive oligarch and the architect “theft of the billion”, play a central role in coordinating the pro-Russian opposition figures. It was extremely active throughout the ICAR monitoring, commenting almost every significant event and amplifying the main Russian narratives.
The second conclusion is that Russia is ready to escalate the pressure on the Republic of Moldova, activating new sensitive points and possibly triggering regional destabilization. Although the separatist region Transnistria remains the traditional lever of Moscow, the Kremlin diversified its approach, transforming Gagauzia into a new hot point.
During the monitored period, the compromised media institutions actively promoted Evghenia Guțul, Gagauziei. The Moldovan authorities are investigating it for the illegal financing of the former Șor party, but Russian propaganda presents the investigation as a proof of the intention of Chisinau to eliminate the autonomy of Gagauzia and to suppress the opposition. The ICAR report found that Moscow makes a systematic and consistent effort to promote these narratives.
Moreover, Russia escalates tensions by exploiting Moldovan fears about a possible war, promoting the idea of ”protecting the Gagauzia” and drawing parallel to the attack on Ukraine, justified by Kremlin by “defending the people of Donbas.” The monitoring of elections in the Republic of Moldova and Georgia in 2024, as well as those in Romania in 2025, shows that this is one of the favorite tactics of Russian propaganda for influencing foreign policy. Moscow will certainly resort to this strategy this fall, when the parliamentary elections in the neighboring country will take place.
The report also shows that Russian propagandists are trying to strengthen Euroscepticism in Moldovan society and undermine population confidence in democratic institutions. Pro-Russian channels emphasize the concrete and immediate benefits of an alliance with Russia, such as lower prices for energy resources.
The main objective of Moscow remains the slowing of the alert rhythm of Moldova to accession to the EU. This is crucial and would prove to the whole world that the Kremlin can reach its goals without resorting to military aggression. The hybrid war carried by Russia is meant to contrast with the damage caused by the Russian army in Ukraine. Chisinau and Kiev began at the same time the process of accession to the EU, and their progress seemed unstoppable until Moscow's intervention.
Kremlin experiment
Chisinau is also a testing ground for the possible future targets of Moscow. The same strategies can no longer be applied in Ukraine, where no elections are organized and where there is no possibility to promote some pro-Russian politicians, as before 2022. Also, the population can no longer be scared with the prospect of a war, this being a reality.
Moscow also aims to undermin the increasing ties of Ukraine with the West, targeting corrupt regimes inside the EU, especially through Viktor Orban, the prime minister of Hungary. Orban is open to Ukraine's accession to the EU and constantly blocks the adoption of substantial sanctions against Russia. A constant ally is also the prime minister of Slovakia, Robert Fico, but he does not show the same level of challenge as the orban pro-Russian.
Although the polls show that Orban's chances of winning the elections are constantly diminishing, Moscow is still based on it. Brussels does not rush to take measures regarding the clearer proximity between Budapest and Moscow. European officials hope that the “Hungarian problem” will be solved by themselves during next year's elections, which could bring a pro-European government. The Kremlin is aware of this, which makes Russia's interference in Hungary elections almost inevitable.




