Two researchers on the future: “About a quarter of Ukraine – about 137,000 square kilometers – is contaminated with unexploded ordnance”

If the fighting were to stop, Ukraine would not be going through a simple period of recovery, but would have to face a very difficult period, write Oleksandr Kraiev and Andreas Umland, in an opinion piece published today by HotNews.

• Oleksandr Kraiev is Program Director at the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” in Kyiv. Andreas Umland is a public policy researcher at the European Policy Institute in Kyiv (EPIK).

In the spring of 2026, the chances of a truce between Ukraine and Russia appear slimmer than ever since US President Donald Trump resumed his peace efforts. Moscow refuses to settle for anything less than at least a partial victory, but it lacks the military force to enforce it. A “balance of death” has settled on the front lines, characterized by drones, war of attrition and minimal territorial gains. War, not peace, remains the most likely scenario.

“If the fighting stopped, Ukraine would not go through a simple period of recovery”

However, history rarely goes as we expect. Europe cannot afford to be unprepared for the consequences of an unexpected ceasefire. If the fighting were to stop, Ukraine would not be going through a simple period of recovery, but would mark the beginning of a new multidimensional confrontation – one that would simultaneously test its security, economy, institutions, demographics and political cohesion. Winning the peace, especially under an imperfect armistice agreement, will be as difficult as surviving the war.

The first and foremost challenge would remain establishing and maintaining security. A ceasefire would not signal a change in the Kremlin's strategic goals.

Without a fundamental transformation of the Russian regime, Moscow would interpret the armistice not as an end point but as a pause—an interregnum in Russia's long imperial campaign.

The reduction in battlefield activity would likely be accompanied by an intensification of the Kremlin's hybrid warfare: cyber attacks, disinformation, industrial sabotage and political subversion, all aimed at undermining the Ukrainian state from within.

The stability of a postwar order would depend less on the legal wording of an agreement than on the balance of power it leaves behind. Pressure on Kiev to demilitarize fortified areas in eastern Ukraine would be particularly dangerous, as it would pave the way for deeper Russian incursions and increase incentives to resume war.

For this reason, Western security guarantees on paper would have no real value if they were not backed by concrete capabilities.

“Build Back Better”

Given the fluctuating politics of Washington in 2025, the main responsibility will fall to Europe. Military aid and defense cooperation should continue to much the same extent as during the war after the ceasefire begins.

The most effective deterrent will lie not in rhetoric, but in quickly implemented practical measures, such as integrating Ukraine's air defenses into NATO's eastern flank, deploying Western aircraft to protect Ukrainian airspace, and facilitating the resumption of civilian air traffic. Security integration should also work both ways.

Ukraine's battle-tested armed forces could strengthen deterrence against Russia in the Baltic region and position the country as a pillar of a new European security architecture.

Over 500 billion dollars will cost to restore the country

Once security is established, economic recovery would be the decisive test. After a GDP decline of more than 30 percent in 2022, Ukraine returned to growth in 2023–2025, despite labor shortages and repeated Russian attacks.

However, the damage is immense. The direct material destruction amounts to more than 195 billion dollars, and the total need for reconstruction over the next ten years is estimated at 588 billion dollars.

Ukraine's renaissance cannot simply mean restoring the pre-war economy. A Build Back Better approach would be essential: decentralized infrastructure, modernized institutions, resilient logistics and a focus on human capital. A few piecemeal projects with money from donations would not be enough.

Instead, international aid – through the EU's €50 billion mechanism for Ukraine and G7 loans secured by frozen Russian assets – should attract private investment. This would also depend on security, the rule of law and ever deeper integration into the EU's single market.

Energy supply is a critical bottleneck. The Ukrainian system has a structural production shortfall of more than 4 gigawatts and remains vulnerable despite compensatory deliveries from Europe. A reconstruction of the centralized systems of the Soviet era would be both impractical and wrong. War suggests a different model: decentralized renewable energy, microgrids and diverse storage capacities.

Modernizing the energy sector alone will require more than $90 billion over the next ten years and at least $5 billion for immediate stabilization once the fighting subsides.

“Ukraine is now the most mined country on Earth”

Equally serious is the problem of what lies beneath Ukraine's soil.

About a quarter of the country – about 137,000 square kilometers – is contaminated with unexploded ordnance. Ukraine is now the most mined country on Earth. The cost of demining is estimated at $34.6 billion over ten years, while the environmental damage exceeds $60 billion.

Without large-scale demining and remediation efforts, reconstruction, agriculture and refugee return will remain impossible.

These are not minor environmental issues, but a physical prerequisite for the country's survival.

The economic recovery will be uneven. While the central and western regions have retained or resumed much of their pre-war social and economic life, the devastated frontline areas in the east and south require tailored strategies to prevent permanent depopulation and impoverishment.

Ukraine's road to the EU and a serious obstacle

In parallel with the reconstruction, Ukraine will travel a long way towards the European Union. Accession is often discussed in political terms, but in reality it is a deeply technical matter. Joining the EU involves implementing around 100,000 pages of European legislation structured into 35 chapters – an extraordinary task even in peacetime. Corruption remains a serious obstacle, although recent scandals have also shown that Ukraine's new post-Euromaidan anti-corruption institutions are becoming increasingly effective.

The political sustainability of the accession process will also depend on concrete progress along the way. Gradual sectoral integration into the EU's single market – transport, energy, digital services – would produce visible results, while negotiations on full membership continue.

However, Ukraine's success will also depend on reforms within the EU. Unanimity rules make enlargement vulnerable to a veto, and the integration of a large country with a significant agricultural and industrial economy like Ukraine will test current EU policies unless some institutional reforms follow.

The process of solving war crimes, meanwhile, will take decades. As of early 2026, Ukrainian authorities had already registered more than 213,000 alleged war crimes. Only a small proportion of these will ever be prosecuted.

Establishing accountability and justice must therefore be approached in a nuanced way.

Senior Russian officials may one day appear before international tribunals. However, most of the perpetrators will never appear before a Ukrainian or international court. Trials in absentia, systematic truth-seeking, and comprehensive commemorative work will therefore be essential to achieve a historical judgment.

From about 42 million, the population dropped to 31.5 million

Domestically, transitional justice with a nuanced approach will be needed. Indiscriminate punishment of all forms of collaboration with the occupiers would overburden the courts and alienate the liberated territories from the rest of the nation. Extrajudicial mechanisms – lustration, conditional amnesties and victim-centred reparations – offer more realistic paths to reconciliation without shirking responsibility.

Underlying all these challenges is a demographic shock unprecedented in Ukraine's post-World War II history.

The population in government-controlled areas has fallen from about 42 million before 2022 to about 31.5 million.

More than six million Ukrainians live as refugees abroad, the birth rate has fallen to less than one child per woman, and the death rate has skyrocketed.

“To rebuild, Ukraine may have no choice but to become a country of immigration”

Peace would not automatically reverse these trends. Some refugees would return, but the lifting of martial law could also trigger a new wave of emigration as men join their families abroad. To rebuild, Ukraine may have no choice but to become a country of immigration, which would mean a profound transformation for both society and politics. If the war drags on, the population decline risks becoming irreversible, further undermining the country's economic viability.

Finally, social stability will be tested as soon as martial law is lifted. The election will revive political competition and expose social divisions between those who returned and those who stayed behind, between veterans and civilians, and between regions scarred by the occupation and those that were relatively spared. Unresolved territorial issues will remain politically explosive. A powerful new electoral bloc of war veterans – numbering more than 800,000 – will shape politics for decades to come. Their reintegration is already one of Ukraine's most urgent social tasks and, at the same time, one of its greatest potential strengths.

The end of the fighting in Ukraine will be celebrated by Ukrainians, but it will not reduce Russian imperialism

This gives rise to three strategic imperatives. First, current planning for “tomorrow” must not distract from sustaining Ukraine's defense efforts today. Military support remains the absolute priority for now.

Second, rebuilding and protecting human capital must begin now and should not wait for peace. Third, Kiev and its partners must prepare intellectually and institutionally for the turbulent developments that will follow the ceasefire.

A victory for Ukraine would strengthen European security and strengthen the European project.

On the other hand, Ukraine's decline during or after the war would give Russia a belated victory and spur authoritarian revisionism far beyond Eastern Europe. S

the end of the fighting – whenever it comes – will be celebrated by Ukrainians, but it will not reduce Russian imperialism or eliminate many of Ukraine's accumulated domestic problems. It will only mean the transition to a new phase of intense political developments, the outcome of which will continue to have an impact on the future of Europe.

The article was originally published in Contributors.ro.