The Paltinu crisis, the consequence of mistakes that left Prahova without water and Romania without energy. The explanations of a specialist

The Paltinu crisis was the inevitable consequence of a chain of technical negligence tolerated over time, of an emptying operated without reserves and without alternative strategies, aggravated by the lack of coordination between institutions and the ignoring of hydrological warnings, turning a predictable intervention into a regional collapse of water supply and into a major energy vulnerability.

Lake Paltinu. Facebook photo

This is the conclusion that emerges from the analysis carried out by the energy expert Dumitru Chisăliță, president of the Intelligent Energy Association, according to which deficiencies were detected in the valves at the emptying facility at the bottom of Lake Paltinu as early as the summer of 2025, which required the water level to drop in order to intervene safely. Later, during the intervention, an access gallery of the dam got clogged, generating the need for other urgent interventions.

“The combination of the dredging works and weather conditions created an imbalance, there was a need to lower the water level to repair the valves and clean the galleries, but in the same lowering of the water level there was a risk of creating a stasis of water for consumption. The recent rains brought a wave of silt into the lake, which increased the turbidity of the water to values ​​well above the permissible limits. The water became 'muddy', which made it impossible to treat it in the treatment syata downstream of the Dam for consumption“, explained the energy expert.

Chronological table with the activities carried out at the Paltinu Dam

Drinking water supply has been temporarily suspended from 28 October 2025 at 15:30, as a result, restrictions, reduced flow or complete shutdown have been imposed on industries and companies using water from this source – depending on availability.

If the decision was made for the population after 28.11.2025, to ensure an alternative distribution of water (mobile tanks, temporary distribution points) until the normalization of the water parameters, for the industry (including energy systems), the water was stopped and will continue to operate until the internal stocks of each commercial company are completed.

Mistakes made that led to the cessation of water supply to the population and industry in Prahova

The authorities that provide the water system (National Administration of Romanian Waters, Hidro Prahova, etc.) admitted that they managed the faulty situation, in addition to natural factors — and a lack of coordination / professionalism, in the sense that they did not take into account the real risk and did not plan adequate reserves.

What was to be done? International good practice.

A. Increasing water storage capacity for emergency situations — buffer tanks

Before the water came down from the lake, you had to:

• 100% filling of the existing tanks

• installation of temporary modular tanks (containers-basins)

• minimum autonomy 24–48 h for all localities

B. Integrated hydrological monitoring and weather forecasting

Before emptying, analyze:

• the risk of emptying

• the risk of alluvium

• “if it rains” scenarios

• extreme turbidity scenarios

Works are not scheduled during the high risk season.

C. Anticipated and Scheduled Communication

The population must be notified with:

• minimum 30 days before emptying

• graphs with planned levels

• list of alternative measures

• periods of temporary restrictions, not total interruption

What was actually done in Paltinu

(these points are documented from chronology and official sources)

A. The lowering of the water level in the lake started before the consumer was ready

• controlled descent began in August 2025

• no operator has created a major alternative source

• the population and industry depended 100% on Paltinu

B. No storage in tanks (autonomy)

• the reserve capacity has not been increased

• no temporary pools were installed

• on the day of the shutdown, many localities ran out of water within a few hours

C. Water levels continued to drop even during some orange hydrologic codes

• on 27–29 November it rained torrentially

• a wave of massive alluvium came

• turbidity became huge

• however, until that day, the lake level was kept very low, which amplified the effect of alluvium

D. The intake has fallen below the recommended level

• in the last days of lowering the water level in the dam, the water available for capture was very close to the bottom of the lake, where there are always:

◦ sludge

◦ clay

◦ alluvium

• water quality deteriorated rapidly

E. There was no working plan B

When turbidity increased:

• there are no wells to receive the supply flow of the water network

• there were no reservations for autonomy in case of crisis

• there were no mobile pipes for supplementing the water level in the network from other sources

• there are no mobile filtering stations

Where did it go wrong?

1. Lack of alternative water sources

2. Lowering of the water level in the lake during weather codes with hydrological risk

3. Lack of water buffer (full tanks)

4. Catchment from deep layers of the lake caused the raw water to become “sludgy”, which made the Voila WWTP non-functional, as it does not have extreme turbidity technology.

5. Delayed Communication. The population had to be notified weeks in advance, not hours.

6. Lack of coordination between institutions

Romanian Waters, Hidroelectrica, ESZ Prahova, CJSU:

• they worked in parallel, not integrated

• decisions were not synchronized

• the information was not fully distributed early

7. The dredging work (GF2) was started without a complete plan

The GF2 plug was discovered in June 2025, the logical question: why wasn't the full plan made before the emptying began?

We estimate that the situation at Paltinu could have been avoided in proportion to 70–90% if:

• alternative sources were prepared

• the reserves were full

• the emptying was coordinated with the weather forecast

• turbidity was monitored in real time on layers

• communication was done on time

As it was handled, the crisis was predictable and largely avoidable.

When could the water supply to the population and industry in Prahova be resumed

The water in a lake similar to Paltinu Lake becomes “clear” again (turbidity within normal limits) only when the alluvium (mud, clay, fine material) brought by the floods begins to settle on the bottom of the lake, ensuring in the area of ​​the catchment mouth (the layer of water from which the catchment is usually at a certain elevation, not at the surface), water with a reduced level of particles. But this only happens if the inflows return to a normal regime, i.e. there are no more mud floods from upstream.

We don't have public “exact discharge per day” data for Paltinu, but in general at a dam of this type:

• the controlled emptying of a large part of the volume (for inspections or works) may take several weeks, depending on:

◦ initial water level,

◦ the allowed flow through bottom emptying,

◦ downstream restrictions (not to flood localities below).

• returning to an acceptable turbidity after a severe episode of turbidity (as it was recently in Paltinu), it can take from a few days to a few weeks for the water captured to be treated to re-enter the parameters — sometimes even longer, if the rains continue and always bring new alluvium (unfortunately, rains are forecast in the area for the next 3 days).

Shutdown of the Brazi Thermal Power Plant

OMV Petrom's Brazi plant has 3 turbines in total — two gas turbines and one steam turbine.

• Gas turbines: 2 × 290 MW

• Steam turbine: 1 × 310 MW

• Total 860 MW and covers approximately 10% of Romania's electricity production.

One of the turbines of the Brazi Power Plant was stopped on December 2, 2025, for 48 hours, and the second turbine will also be stopped at 24. The reason given is “low technological water flow”. The problem was identified — according to a press release — as a result of breakdowns announced by Romanian Waters

Why does the Brazi OMV Petrom power plant need water?

The OMV Petrom power plant in Brazi is a gas-steam combined cycle (CCGT) plant, and this type of plant needs large amounts of water for several essential technical processes.

1. Cooling of installations (the most important function)

Gas turbine and steam turbine produce a lot of heat.

Water is used in the cooling system to:

• condense the steam at the exit of the steam turbine

• keeps the temperature of the equipment within safe limits

• avoid overloading and wear of installations

Without enough water, the boiler cannot condense the steam, which stops the entire thermal cycle, the boiler must be switched off.

2. Steam production for the steam turbine

In a combined cycle plant:

◦ The gas turbine produces electricity.

◦ The hot exhaust gases are used to produce steam.

◦ This steam drives the second turbine, the steam turbine, increasing the overall efficiency.

To produce this steam, you need demineralized water, very pure, used in recovery boilers.

3. Chemical treatments and auxiliary processes

Water is also used for:

• maintaining the pressure and temperature in the circuits

• chemical treatment to protect the equipment

• periodic cleaning and washing of some components

4. Why turning off the water stops the plant that produces electricity in the CCGT

Not enough water flow:

• steam condensation can no longer take place → the steam turbine stops

• cooling systems no longer work → risk of overheating

• operational safety cannot be maintained

Therefore, the plant goes into controlled shutdown.

The impact of the stoppage of the OMV Petrom Plant in Brazi

The partial shutdown of the OMV Petrom power plant on December 2, 2025, caused a decrease in the production of electricity from hydrocarbons by 344 MWh (26%) between 8 a.m. and 1 p.m., according to Transelectrica data. Between the same hours we have an increase in imports by 490 MWh (73%). On 2.12.2025 at 1 p.m., electricity imports in Romania were 1175 MWh (15%) compared to 678 MWh (9%) at 8 a.m. We estimate that they could reach a level of about 2000 MWh (26%) on 3.12.2025 and remain at this level until the restart of Cetrala from Brazi (2-5 days).

This situation may raise issues of electricity price increase in the wholesale market, which will be paid by consumers in the coming months. We will not have a retail price increase in December 2025.

The impact of the shutdown of the Brazi OMV Petrom Power Plant on the price of electricity in Romania is already felt in the market, the average price of PZU Romania on 3.12.2025 compared to 2.12.2025 increased by 14%.

The water crisis caused by the situation in Paltinu can have a domino impact: from supplying the population, to industry, to the production of electricity and heating. In the current context, in an area like Prahova / Ploiesti / the region supplied by the dam, it is not only a discomfort for the population, but also a structural vulnerability for industries and energy suppliers.